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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Across the United States, many resettled Iraqi refugees are wondering how, after fleeing 
persecution at home to seek refuge in a country that barely tolerated them, they have 
found themselves in “the land of opportunity” with little hope of achieving a secure and 
decent life.  From Washington, D.C. to Detroit1 to San Diego, recently resettled Iraqi 
refugees face odds so heavily stacked against them that most end up jobless, some even 
homeless. 
 
One Iraqi widow in D.C. lives with her three young children in a shelter. “I left Iraq to find 
security,” she says.  “But what kind of security is it to live in a homeless shelter?”2 
 
This report seeks to shed light on the oft-forgotten domestic side of the refugee equation, 
focusing on Iraqis recently resettled in the United States.  Though many advocates worked 
tirelessly to encourage the U.S. government to accept Iraqis who were forced to flee a war 
initiated by the United States, few have studied what happens to those refugees after they 
arrive here.  Indeed, while the international community identifies resettlement as one of 
three “durable solutions” for refugees, there has been scarce focus on just how durable the 
U.S. resettlement system actually is.   
 
The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) is unique in giving new life and 
opportunity to millions of refugees, accepting many times more than the rest of the world 
combined.   But this report finds that the United States is opening its gates to refugees and 
simply forgetting about them after they have arrived.  In the process, the United States is in 
danger of failing to meet its legal obligations to extend protection to the most vulnerable 
refugees, promote their long-term self-sufficiency, and support their integration.3  As these 
new refugees from Iraq arrive in ever-greater numbers,4 and as the U.S. economy 
continues to offer little prospect for those seeking work, there is an urgent need to diagnose 
the ills of refugee resettlement before they become incurable. 
 
This report is the culmination of months of research by a team of students at Georgetown 
University Law Center in Washington, D.C.  The topic was proposed and designed by 
members of the student group Georgetown Human Rights Action in partnership with the 
Law Center’s Human Rights Institute.  The project sought to determine the extent to which 
Iraqi refugees have been afforded protection and a durable solution through the USRAP.5  
To this end, researchers conducted extensive fact-finding, including interviews in the 
                                                 
1 For the sake of clarity and for the confidentiality of our refugee interviewees, this report will refer to the 
Washington, D.C. metro area and the Detroit metro area as “D.C.” and “Detroit,” respectively. 
2 Interview with DHTO 1, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 11, 2009). 
3 This project sought to determine the extent to which Iraqi refugees have been afforded protection and a durable 
solution through the USRAP.  Throughout the report, the broad terms long-term self-sufficiency and long-term 
integration is used to describe both the goal of the USRAP and the standard against which it is measured.  The 
term is intended to carry a particular legal connotation as a reference to refugee law as well as a group of 
international human rights norms, both of which are echoed in the USRAP legal framework. If the United States is 
to meet its own aims and serve as a guarantor of security for those it welcomes to its shores, it is imperative that 
U.S. policies be based on respect for these legal norms.   
4 DEP’T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT AS OF AUGUST 31, 2009 
[hereinafter August 2009 Admissions Report], available at 
http://wrapsnet.org/Reports/AdmissionsArrivals/tabid/211/language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
5 We are aware that “USRAP” technically refers to the program administered by the Department of State’s Bureau 
of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) that coordinates the admission of refugees into the United States.  We 
are also aware that the services provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) are often not considered part of the USRAP.  In this report, however, we will use the term 
USRAP to refer to the entire process and program: from the identification of refugees to their arrival in the United 
States, and from their initial placement to their longer-term integration.  We do so both to simplify terminology and 
to reinforce our belief that the USRAP should function as a single program. 
 2 
Washington, D.C.; Detroit, Michigan; San Diego, California; and Amman, Jordan.  In order 
to evaluate the USRAP, researchers used U.S. obligations to refugees under international 
and domestic law as a baseline.   
 
The project’s research supports the following findings that are further detailed in the report: 
 
• Iraqi refugees rarely enjoy legal protection and long-term self-sufficiency in Jordan.  
The overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees interviewed in Jordan could not secure 
legal employment in the formal economy.  Not all Iraqi refugees are registered with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which compromises 
their ability to gain access to assistance.  Moreover, most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do 
not have access to adequate legal protections such as residency, work permits, and 
police protection, and are discriminated against, extorted, and abused as a result. 
 
• Resettlement remains an important solution for many Iraqi refugees.  Some 
refugees, including particularly vulnerable refugees, are refusing resettlement offers 
to the United States because of a perceived lack of post-resettlement services. 
However, most Iraqi refugees interviewed for this report desired to be resettled to 
the United States.  
 
• The application of mainstream U.S. anti-poverty programs to refugee assistance 
under the USRAP does not promote the long-term self-sufficiency of refugees.  It 
does not break down barriers to sustainable employment, employment services are 
not properly funded, English language training is insufficient, transportation is 
inadequate, and professional recertification is not viable.  These deficiencies result in 
low employment rates for Iraqi refugees.  Additionally, cash assistance is insufficient, 
both in amount and duration, to allow refugees to support themselves.  Finally, the 
USRAP makes it difficult for refugees to secure medical care, and treatment options 
are insufficient to address the serious mental health issues that affect many Iraqi 
refugees. 
 
• Poor planning and coordination throughout the USRAP amplify the problems that 
refugees face.  Pre-resettlement processing takes little account of post-resettlement 
needs when gathering information about individual refugees. The USRAP does not 
base services capacity-setting on current or future refugee flows, leaving programs 
improperly funded.  Secondary migration is not properly tracked, further preventing 
the USRAP from targeting resources to actual needs.  
 
In accordance with these findings, this report presents the following general 
recommendations: 
 
• Refugee resettlement should be decoupled from U.S. anti-poverty programs and 
tailored to the unique needs and experiences of refugees.  Refugee assistance should 
be increased from eight to eighteen months, and programs designed to promote the 
long-term self-sufficiency and integration of refugees should be better funded.  A 
stronger emphasis should be placed on the core barriers to self-sufficiency and 
integration, including lack of English language skills, lack of transportation, and lack 
of opportunities for education and recertification.   
 
• Funding for employment and social services should be tailored to estimates of 
incoming refugee arrivals and secondary migration, as well as the unique needs of 
these particular groups.  Funding should not be based on the number of past refugee 
arrivals.   
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• All actors within the USRAP must improve planning and information sharing 
capabilities.  Planning should anticipate and prepare for the unique needs of each 
refugee group prior to arrival.  In order to tailor services for refugees, actors must 
take into account important information on refugees collected in the resettlement 
process, such as health status and professional background. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What happens to Iraqi refugees after they have been resettled in the United States?  How 
effective is the USRAP in helping to ensure long-term self-sufficiency and integration?  To 
answer these questions, teams of Georgetown Law students conducted extensive interviews 
in Detroit, Michigan, and the Washington, D.C. metro-area in March 2009, in Amman, 
Jordan in May 2009, and in San Diego, California in August 2009.  In the United States, 
researchers interviewed Iraqi refugees, voluntary agencies (volags) that resettle refugees, 
government and not-for-profit organizations that provide services to refugees, and policy 
makers that shape and implement the USRAP.  In Amman, researchers interviewed Iraqi 
refugees that were in the process of being resettled to the United States and those who 
were considering resettlement to the United States.  The research team also interviewed 
individuals at the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and 
international and domestic non-governmental organizations that work with Iraqi refugees.   
 
A full accounting of all individuals and organizations interviewed can be found in Appendix I.  
For the safety of participating refugees, all names of refugees in this report appear as 
aliases.  Similarly, in many cases researchers spoke to individuals who work in various 
aspects of refugee resettlement who provided information on condition of anonymity.  Such 
information is attributed to a generic person with his or her employment title, such as “a 
caseworker.” 
 
This report is organized in several Parts.  Part II provides an overview of the USRAP and 
explains how it works.  In this Part, the report discusses the various stakeholders and their 
roles and functions within the program are discussed.  It also places special emphasis on 
how the USRAP operates within the global refugee protection framework, and the 
international refugee and human rights law that supports it.   
 
Drawing on the team’s research concerning Iraqi refugees in Jordan, a primary destination 
for refugees fleeing Iraq, Part III addresses why resettlement is such an important solution 
for the most vulnerable Iraqi refugees.  For these refugees, repatriation to Iraq and local 
integration in countries of first asylum are not viable options.  The research team found that 
Iraqis in Jordan are generally unable to become self-sufficient, cannot access basic rights 
and protections, and face discrimination and abuse.  This makes life in Jordan unsustainable 
for most Iraqi refugees and resettlement to third countries, like the United States, an 
important protection option. 
 
Part IV explains how resettlement in the United States has left many Iraqi refugees in a 
precarious situation.  The research team found that the USRAP is not doing enough to 
promote the long-term self-sufficiency and integration of Iraqi refugees resettled to Detroit, 
San Diego, and D.C.  Refugees do not receive enough financial assistance, and services 
remain insufficient to prepare refugees for sustainable employment.  Meanwhile, the lack of 
strategic planning and coordination within the USRAP amplify these problems by failing to 
anticipate the needs of refugee populations prior to arrival and failing to direct precious 
resources to localities with the highest numbers of arriving refugees. 
 
Part V provides the conclusion, and Part VI proposes recommendations. 
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II. RESETTLEMENT AND THE USRAP 
 
The USRAP fits into the broader international framework that regulates the legal status of 
refugees outlined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention) and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol).6  The 
Refugee Convention and Protocol are the principal international instruments established for 
the protection of refugees and provide the most comprehensive codification of the rights of 
refugees worldwide.  These international instruments define the term “refugee” and 
establish basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees.7  One of the most 
important underlying principles of the Convention is a state commitment to nonrefoulement.  
That is, persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group, cannot be forcibly 
returned to their country of origin.8   
 
The UNHCR is mandated with the task of protecting and assisting refugees.9  Under the 
Refugee Convention and Protocol, contracting states undertake to cooperate with the 
UNHCR in the exercise of its functions.10  While the UNHCR's primary purpose is to 
safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees, its ultimate goal is to find durable solutions 
that will enable refugees to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace.  There are three possible 
solutions promoted by the UNHCR: voluntary repatriation to a refugee’s home country; local 
integration in the country of first asylum; or resettlement to a third country when it is 
impossible for a person return home or remain in the host country.11  Of these three 
solutions, resettlement remains the least utilized, with less than one percent of all refugees 
worldwide resettled to third countries.12 
 
Despite the low number of refugees who benefit from resettlement, it is an extremely 
important protection tool.  First, resettlement serves as an instrument for international 
responsibility and burden sharing.  Today, developing countries serve as countries of first 
asylum to the vast majority of refugees, while more developed countries conduct 
resettlement programs.13  Second, when used strategically, resettlement is a tool that 
governments can use in diplomatic relations to help secure additional benefits for refugees 
who will not be resettled.  That is, countries like the United States can offer to resettle some 
                                                 
6 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Jul. 28, 1951 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951) [hereinafter Refugee 
Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force 
Oct. 4, 1967. 
7 With respect to access to courts, elementary school education, public assistance, and social security, refugees are 
afforded rights equivalent to those of the nationals in the country in which they reside.  See Refugee Convention, 
supra note 6, arts. 22-24.  For many other matters, including housing and employment provisions, refugees are 
afforded “treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances.”  Id. at arts. 18, 21.  Refugees are also afforded basic rights under 
international human rights norms, many of which are widely considered to be customary international law.   For 
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that every person is afforded “a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
8 See Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. I(a)(2). 
9 See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. res. 428 (V), annex, 5 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html. 
10 See Refugee Convention, supra note 6, preamble. 
11 “What We Do”, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbf.html. 
12 Erika Feller, Assistant High Comm’r – Protection, Statement to the Fifty-eighth Session of the Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme in Geneva (Oct. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/4704d4f32.pdf.  
13 Global Consultations on International Protection, 2001-2002, Strengthening and Expanding Resettlement Today: 
Dilemmas, Challenges and Opportunities, EC/GC/02/7 (Apr. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Strengthening and Expanding 
Resettlement Today]. 
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refugees if the host country agrees to locally integrate or provide work permits for other 
refugees.14  Third, refugees gain legal protection through resettlement that they might not 
otherwise have, such as legal residency and public assistance.15  Fourth, resettled refugees 
bring many assets to their new communities, spur economic growth, and stimulate 
transformative cross-cultural experiences.16  Finally, resettled refugees are often able to 
provide remittances to friends and family members in countries of origin and first asylum.17   
 
The USRAP 
 
Although refugee resettlement to the United States historically had geo-political overtones, 
it has evolved to primarily serve as a vehicle to provide safety and sanctuary for those of 
particular humanitarian concern.18  Following the large numbers of refugees that began 
arriving in the United States from Southeast Asia in the 1970s, Congress officially 
established the USRAP through the Refugee Act of 1980.19  The Refugee Act has two basic 
purposes: to provide a uniform procedure for refugee admissions, and to authorize federal 
assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency.20  It also recognizes the 
role of the federal government in assisting states, private volags, and local communities in 
resettling refugees.  Thus, the USRAP serves as a true public-private partnership designed 
to facilitate the resettlement of refugees. 
 
Three U.S. government agencies are responsible for the central functions of the USRAP: 
 
? The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), adjudicates individual refugee admissions cases overseas 
through the overseas deployment of its Refugee Corps.  
 
? The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) sets 
refugee admissions policy and provides refugee assistance both overseas and in the 
initial resettlement period. 
 
? The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), administers comprehensive resettlement services including 
employment training, English language acquisition, cash assistance, and other 
refugee services after a refugee has been resettled. 
 
To begin the resettlement process, most refugees gain access to the USRAP by first fleeing 
from their home country to a country of first asylum, such as Jordan or Syria, where they 
register with the government or the UNHCR, or both, to seek protection.  After registering 
with the UNHCR, refugees who meet resettlement protection criteria may be referred to the 
                                                 
14 See Jeremy Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 
15 (2008) (finding that although Jordan has not generally welcomed Iraqi refugees or provided them with basic 
legal protections such as legal residency, Jordan’s positive relationships with Western countries has enabled some 
Iraqi refugees to access refugee assistance in Jordan). 
15 For example, most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do not have the legal rights and privileges typically afforded refugees 
in countries like the United States, as Jordan and Syria are not parties to the Refugee Convention. See AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, RHETORIC AND REALITY: THE IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS (2008). 
16 See Strengthening and Expanding Resettlement Today, supra note 13. 
17 Id. 
18 See B. S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions 
to Refugee Problems (May 1999), http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0c50.pdf. 
19 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter Refugee Act].  The Refugee Act is 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 and in the Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] §§ 411-414.   
20 See Andorra Bruno and Katherine Bush, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (1982); Maurice Roberts, The U.S. and Refugees: The Refugee Act of 1980, 12 ISSUE: 
A JOURNAL OF OPINION ½ (1982). 
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USRAP.21  Following referral from the UNHCR, the PRM contracts with Overseas Processing 
Entities (OPEs) to conduct refugee intake interviews in the countries of first asylum.22  The 
contracted OPE conducts a series of interviews to prepare a refugee’s persecution claim for 
adjudication by the Refugee Corps.  
 
Once refugees are approved by the Refugee Corps, the OPE ensures that they pass a 
medical clearance, complete a security check, and that a volag can deliver the necessary 
resettlement services in the United States.23  Volags are, for the most part, large, private, 
not-for-profit organizations that are predominantly responsible for administering initial 
reception and placement services and longer-term resettlement services.24  Volag 
representatives meet every Wednesday at the Refugee Processing Center in Arlington, 
Virginia to decide where in the United States to resettle approved cases.25  These decisions 
are based on refugee biographical data collected by the OPE, which includes information on 
family size, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and medical conditions.   
 
The OPE coordinates refugee travel to the United States when it is notified that the refugee 
passed both the medical check and security clearance, and that a volag has assured the 
refugee’s placement.26  While refugees await departure, they attend an optional cultural 
orientation, arranged by the PRM, but often conducted by organizations such as the IOM.27 
 
Upon a refugee’s arrival in the United States, the first set of resettlement services falls 
under the PRM’s Reception and Placement (R&P) program, which is designed to meet 
refugees’ immediate needs during the first thirty days after arrival.28  In theory, refugees 
simultaneously gain access to the ORR’s Refugee Assistance Program (RAP), which is 
intended to provide cash and medical assistance to eligible refugees for at least the first 
eight months after arrival, while they integrate into American society and search for 
employment.29  Refugee Social Services (RSS), Targeted Assistance Grants (TAG), or the 
Matching Grant (MG) program – all three of which are overseen by the ORR – can fund 
employment training.30  The ORR also administers additional programs on an ad hoc basis to 
facilitate refugee resettlement.31 
 
 
                                                 
21 Some refugees are able to directly apply to the U.S. government for resettlement and need not be registered 
with UNHCR.  This applies to those who meet the criteria of the priority two (P-2) processing category for Iraqis.  
See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, Public Law 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008). 
22 For most Iraqi refugees, the OPE is the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
23  David Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of Refugee Resettlement, 
137-143, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf.  Consider, for example, the 
activities of IOM in Jordan.  See IOM-Jordan webpage available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/424. 
24 There are nine volags: Church World Services, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Ethiopian Community Development 
Council, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops/Migration and Refugee 
Service, and World Relief.  One state, Iowa, runs its own refugee resettlement agency under the Iowa Department 
of Human Services. 
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2) for placement guidelines and requirements. 
26 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
27 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
28 See PRM’s Iraqi Refugee Assistance and Resettlement Webpage, http://www.state.gov/g/prm/c25771.htm (last 
visited Sep. 29, 2009). 
29 Congress also created Wilson-Fish programs to allow for ORR to contract directly with volags in states without 
official refugee coordination.  Wilson-Fish programs allow volags, some individual states, and other resettlement 
agencies to apply directly to ORR for special funding.  This funding is intended to assist refugees with self-
sufficiency and integration through the creation of alternatives to the standard methods of dispersing public 
assistance. See Wilson/Fish Amendment, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837 (1984) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1522(e)(7)).  
There are currently eleven states operating a Wilson-Fish program, as well as the county of San Diego in California.   
30 45 C.F.R. §§ 400.154, 44.206. 
31 Id. §§ 400.205, 400.207. 
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Matching Grant 
 
Under the MG program, a refugee receives a combination of cash assistance and 
employment services over the course of four to six months, with the goal of using 
employment as a means to achieving full economic self-sufficiency. The MG program is 
funded through a combination of the volags’ own resources, which are then matched by the 
ORR.  The program is implemented by one of the nine volags through their networks of local 
affiliates. 
 
As the world’s largest resettlement program, the USRAP has a long history of offering a 
fresh start for many of the world’s most vulnerable people, without discriminating on the 
basis of race, religion, social or political affiliation, or educational or skill level.  However, 
the population it serves and the environment in which it functions have changed drastically 
in the near thirty years since its creation.  When the Refugee Act of 1980 was drafted, the 
United States admitted a relatively homogenous group of refugees from Southeast Asia.32  
The processing, cultural orientation, reception and placement, and resettlement services 
programs were designed for a single population and its specific needs.  Today, the United 
States admits a culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse caseload of refugees from 
over sixty countries, all of whom have very particular and different histories of persecution 
and needs.33  Nevertheless, the same one-size-fits-all system designed largely for Southeast 
Asians is still in place, presenting distinct and novel challenges for the resettlement of new 
populations entering the United States, including Iraqis. 
 
The USRAP and the Iraqi Refugee Crisis 
 
The UNHCR High Commissioner, Antonio Guterres, declared the Iraqi refugee crisis to be 
“the most significant displacement in the Middle East” since the displacement of Palestinians 
following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.34 With relatively little 
displacement at the beginning of the Iraq war, the number of displaced Iraqis rose 
dramatically after the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari mosque in Samarra, which 
ignited sectarian and ethnic conflict throughout Iraq.35 The UNHCR and host governments 
have estimated that a total of 4.5 million Iraqis have been displaced both inside Iraq and to 
neighboring countries.36    
 
In response, human rights and refugee advocacy groups asked the United States to provide 
assistance and resettlement to displaced Iraqis.37  Many of the groups argued that the 
United States had a particular responsibility to Iraqis given its role in the invasion of Iraq in 
                                                 
32 REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, HISTORY OF THE U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM, 
http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=history. 
33 See August 2009 Admissions Report, supra note 4.  
34 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES , UNHCR’S ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION NEEDS OF IRAQI ASYLUM-SEEKERS 21 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46deb05557. 
35 Kelly O’Donnell and Kathleen Newland, Migration Policy Institute, The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action 
(2008), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-The_Iraqi_Refugee_Crisis_The_Need_for_Action_011808.pdf. 
36 Host governments and UNHCR continue to cite this figure.  See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR 
GLOBAL APPEAL 2009 UPDATE (2009).  However, at the writing of this report many prominent authorities on the issue 
estimate that Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons range in the hundreds of thousands, not millions.   
37 See RefugeesInternational.org, Joint NGO Statement on Iraqi Refugee Needs (Jul. 25, 2007), 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/letter/joint-ngo-statement-iraqi-refugee-needs (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009); Press Release, Refugee Council USA, Iraqi Refugees Require Urgent Protection and Assistance (May 21, 
2007); Press Release, Amnesty International, Iraq: US, UK and other states must protect Iraqi refugees (Feb. 9, 
2007). 
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2003.38  Yet the United States responded very slowly to calls for resettlement, admitting 
only 1,608 Iraqi refugees in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.39   
 
Under pressure from advocacy groups and increased reporting on the plight of Iraqi 
refugees, the United States ultimately began resettling more Iraqis.  In the fall of 2007, 
Congress passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, providing admission for Iraqis that worked 
for the United States or its contractors in Iraq, and allowing in-country processing for at-risk 
Iraqis.40  In 2008, the United States appointed two Senior Coordinators for Iraqi Refugees, 
one at the Department of State and one at the DHS, to strengthen the American 
humanitarian commitment to refugees with a particular emphasis on resettlement.41  In FY 
2008, the United States resettled 13,822 Iraqi refugees.42 As of August 31, 2009, the 
United States has resettled 16,965 Iraqi refugees in FY 2009, totaling over 33,000 since the 
2003 war.43  These refugees have been resettled throughout the United States, with some 
of the largest populations in Detroit, Southern California, and D.C.44  
 
With millions displaced and only a few thousand resettlement slots available worldwide, the 
UNHCR developed 11 resettlement eligibility criteria for Iraqi refugees: 
 
(1) Survivors of torture and violence, including sexual and gender based violence; 
(2) Members of minority groups and persons targeted due to their ethnicity or sect; 
(3) Women at risk in country of asylum; 
(4) Unaccompanied or separate children; 
(5) Dependents of refugees living in resettlement countries; 
(6) Elderly refugees; 
(7) Refugees with medical needs; 
(8) High profile cases; 
(9) Iraqis who fled due to their associations with U.S. or other foreign institutions; 
(10) Stateless persons; 
(11) Iraqis at risk of refoulement 
 
When the U.S. government committed to resettle Iraqis, it essentially agreed to these 
criteria.  Yet the USRAP expects the most vulnerable refugees will find employment and 
become self-sufficient almost immediately.  Thus, the United States offers resettlement to 
those refugees with particular vulnerabilities that can inhibit their ability to achieve self-
sufficiency while expecting them to quickly become self-sufficient.   
                                                 
38 The List Project and Human Rights First were among the first organizations that advocated for those refugees 
who faced persecution due to their affiliations with U.S. institutions in Iraq.  See The List Project Website, 
http://www.thelistproject.org; Kirk Johnson, Hounded by Insurgents, Abandoned by Us, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007 
(Mr. Johnson is the founder and executive director of The List Project; he was an early advocate for special 
admission of Iraqis who helped the United States during the war and reconstruction efforts); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
PROMISES TO THE PERSECUTED: THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN IRAQ ACT OF 2008 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO CONFRONT 
THE IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS: A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION (2008). 
39 See August 2009 Admissions Report, supra note 4. 
40 See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, supra note 21. 
41 See id.; Letter from Bill Frelick, Refugee Policy Director, and Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director, 
Human Rights Watch, to Ambassador James B. Foley, Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues, Dep’t. of State, 
and Lori Scialabba, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Sep. 24, 2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/09/24/letter-ambassador-foley-and-lori-scialabba-iraqi-refugees. 
42 See August 2009 Admissions Report, supra note 4. 
43 Id.  The total includes Iraqi refugees admitted in FY 2003, some of which were probably admitted before the Iraq 
war began. 
44 See Iraqi refugee arrivals by state tabulated on ORR’s website, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/refugee_arrival_data.htm; see also Detroit Expects Half of Iraqi 
Refugees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jun. 7, 2007; Hanna Ingbwer Win, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Seeking Asylum 
and a Better Life, California’s Iraqi Refugees Find Themselves in Limbo, LA WEEKLY, May 20, 2009 (stating that 
5,000 new Iraqi refugees will arrive by the end of fiscal year 2009); see also Appendix II. 
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The disconnect between the goals of refugee resettlement and how the USRAP operates in 
practice has real effects on the lives of Iraqi refugees.  As this report shows in Part III, Iraqi 
refugees in countries of first asylum, such as Jordan, are making decisions about 
resettlement to the United States in extremely difficult circumstances.  Faced with poor 
conditions in Amman and uncertainty about resettlement, many Iraqis question whether 
resettlement to the United States is worth it.  In Part IV, this report shows why Iraqi 
refugees are justifiably skeptical of resettlement to the United States.  The USRAP has failed 
to promote their long-term self-sufficiency, and this failure has led to a new refugee crisis in 
the very land that has been the destination of hope for many of the world’s most vulnerable 
refugees.  
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III. IRAQI REFUGEES ARE STILL IN DIRE NEED OF RESETTLEMENT 
 
The case for resettlement must be considered in the context of the other two durable 
solutions for Iraqi refugees: repatriation and integration in countries of first asylum.   
 
On the first of these possible solutions, repatriation, international humanitarian groups 
agree that Iraq is still not safe enough to allow return.45  And although some are returning, 
there is “still no big flow back into Iraq.”46  The International Commission of the Red Cross 
informally estimates the flow at close to one percent of the total refugee population and 
believes that “most come in to look and see if its safe, if their property is still there, [and so 
on], then quickly [go] back [to countries of asylum].”47 There are no credible reports of 
Iraqi refugees returning home in significant numbers.48   
 
Similarly, integration into countries of first asylum is a mere theoretical possibility for many 
Iraqi refugees. The ability of Iraqi refugees to enjoy legal protection and long-term self-
sufficiency in Jordan remains severely limited.  The overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees 
interviewed in Jordan could not secure legal employment in the formal economy.49  Not all 
Iraqi refugees are registered with the UNHCR, which compromises their ability to gain 
access to assistance. Moreover, most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do not have access to 
adequate legal protections such as residency, work permits, and police protection, and are 
discriminated against, extorted, and abused as a result. 
 
The inability of many Iraqi refugees to return to Iraq, combined with the dire situation they 
face in places like Jordan, leaves resettlement to third countries like the United States the 
only viable option.  Some refugees, including particularly vulnerable refugees, are refusing 
resettlement offers to the United States because of a perceived lack of post-resettlement 
services; however, most Iraqi refugees we spoke to wanted to be resettled to the United 
States.  
 
A. Iraqi Refugees in Jordan Lack Basic Legal Protections 
 
“How do you get by without jobs?” an interviewer asked Salim, an unemployed Iraqi 
refugee living in Amman.  “We sell property in Iraq.  Some of us are receiving assistance 
from relatives abroad.  Some ‘volunteer’ and get paid without a contract. Others work 
secretly but if caught, then they have problems.  We know many who have been caught and 
deported,” he said.50 
 
                                                 
45 This is most clearly shown by the fact that UNHCR, in revising their protection guidelines to exclude Iraqis from 
Northern and Southern Iraq from the prima facie recognition procedure, stated, “It is UNHCR’s assessment that the 
improvement of the situation in Iraq does not yet constitute fundamental changes… it is UNHCR’s recommendation 
that individuals already benefiting from international protection, whether on a prima facie basis or following 
individual status determination, should retain their status.”  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR’S 
ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NEEDS OF IRAQI ASYLUM-SEEKERS (2009) (emphasis 
in original), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4a2640852&query=iraq. 
46 Interview with Martin Thalmann, Deputy Head of Delegation, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Amman, Jordan (May 
20, 2009). 
47 Id. 
48 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FACT SHEET: IRAQI REFUGEE RETURNS: NOT A SOLUTION RIGHT NOW (2008). 
49 “Legitimate employment” refers to those who live and work in Jordan with legal residency and receive no 
assistance. This describes only one person interviewed. See Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan. (May 23, 
2009). 
50 Interview with IKJG 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009).  
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Of the twenty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed in Jordan, only one had secured gainful legal 
employment.51  Stories of “getting by” were commonplace;52 those who had savings were 
hoping to be resettled before it was depleted.53  Many were dependent on assistance54 or 
help from family outside Jordan.55 
 
Among those few Iraqis who were able to work illegally, stories of discrimination were 
common.  Zainab and her daughter Razia fled to Amman but said they have found “no 
security [there].”  Only Razia found a job; however, this was working alongside a Jordanian 
girl who was paid ten times Razia’s salary.  “If an Iraqi is lucky enough to get a job, 
employers will fire him or her for arbitrary reasons or pretexts,” said Zainab.56   
 
Shaimaa, a woman in her twenties, also spoke to researchers about refugees’ vulnerabilities 
in the workplace.  Before fleeing Iraq, Shaimaa was a student and had completed two years 
of college for graphic design.  Because of her computer skills, she was able to find a job in 
Amman as a typist in a lawyer’s office.  When she went to a bank to cash her first check, 
however, she was told that the check was deficient and could not be cashed.  She was 
saddened to have encountered such “oppression” while waiting for resettlement when, as 
she says, “We have been so patient.”57  Given the sensitivity of the issue, fear of arrest, and 
the fact that termination is used as a mechanism of control over those working illegally, it is 
likely that refugees experience even more workplace discrimination than they reported to 
the researchers. 
 
Iraqi refugees living in Jordan lack many other basic legal protections as well.  Only one of 
the twenty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed in Jordan had secured legal residency.  One 
international aid worker, emphasizing the difficult circumstances Iraqis faced, said “Jordan 
is temporary. [Iraqi refugees] cannot get residency or full rights. They cannot work. [But 
return to] Iraq is not an option.”58 Another aid worker called Jordan an “ambiguous legal 
space,” emphasizing the unreliable nature of legal protections Iraqi refugees have there.59 
 
                                                 
51 Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009). 
52 Interview with DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009) (stated that between the small stipend he gets from 
his volunteer position and the cash assistance his family receives from UNHCR each month, he can just afford to 
pay his rent). 
53 Interview with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with IKSA 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 
2009); Interview with JGLP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 
23, 2009); Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009).  
54 Interview with IKJG 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 2, Amman, Jordan (May, 20, 
2009); Interview with IKJG 3, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 4, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 
2009); Interview with IKJG 5, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 6, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 
2009); Interview with IKJG 7, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 8, Amman, Jordan (May, 20, 
2009); Interview with IKJG 9, Amman, Jordan (May, 20, 2009); Interview with TODA 1, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 
2009); Interview with TODA 2, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 3, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 
2009); Interview with TODA 4, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 5, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 
2009); Interview with TODA 6, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 7, Amman Jordan (May 21, 
2009); Interview with TODA 9, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with IKJG 10, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 
2009); Interview with DATO 1, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, Amman, Jordan (May, 22, 
2009); Interview with DATO 5, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with JGLP 2, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 
2009).  
55 Interview with DATO 2, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with IKSA 1, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); 
Interview with JGLP 1, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with DATO 4, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); 
Interview with SALP 2, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009). 
56 Interview with TODA 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).  
57 Interview with TODA 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).  
58 Interview with Nour Sha’sha’a, Cmty. Mobilization & Outreach Coordinator, Save the Children, Amman, Jordan 
(May 20, 2009). 
59 Interview with Elizabeth Biermann, Int’l Catholic Migration Comm’n, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).   
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Life without legal status presents dire risks.  One aid worker reported hearing stories in 
which a Jordanian bailed an Iraqi out of jail but kept the Iraqi’s passport, extorting money 
until his case was resolved.60  Although Jordan has become much safer for Iraqis, many still 
fear the police.61  One young Iraqi man said he heard a rumor that the Jordanian police 
were assembling a special committee to deport Iraqis. “[It] makes me feel that the threat to 
me in Jordan is equal to the threat I face[d] in Iraq because I can be sent back anytime the 
Jordanian government pleases. And if that happens, I will be killed,” he said.62  Stories like 
these show that even rumors and limited knowledge can have devastating effects, and that 
the position of Iraqi refugees in countries of first asylum is tenuous.   
 
Despite such challenges, only twenty-three of the twenty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed 
were registered with the UNHCR,63 which funds much of the assistance provided to refugees 
in Jordan.  By the end of 2008, over 50,000 Iraqi refugees were registered in Jordan, only a 
fraction of the total Iraqi refugee population believed to be residing there.64  The UNHCR 
and partner organizations use registration as an opportunity to connect refugees with 
service providers and the registration data obtained to tailor assistance programs.65  For the 
six unregistered Iraqi refugees researchers spoke to, and the thousands of others they did 
not meet, access to assistance and services is quite limited.  
 
B. Resettlement Remains an Imperfect but Important Choice for Iraqi Refugees 
 
Given the difficulties Iraqi refugees face in countries of first asylum and the impossibility of 
return to Iraq, resettlement remains an important option. For example, several Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan emphasized that despite their concerns about the lack of support 
available to refugees resettled in the United States, the formal legal status provided by the 
U.S. resettlement system "made all of the difference."66  However, resettlement to the 
United States, or another third country, is not a panacea to be pursued at the exclusion of 
other durable solutions.   
 
As Naima, a forty-five-year-old Iraqi refugee who speaks little English and was preparing to 
be resettled in Arizona a month later, said, “I have lived through wars since I was thirteen.”  
She was excited about Arizona because it is a desert “like Iraq” but summed up the 
uncertainty she felt in coming to the United States: 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Interview with JGLP 2, in Amman, Jordan. (May 23, 2009).  
63 Interview with IKJG 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 
2009); Interview with IKJG 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 
20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 6, in Amman, Jordan 
(May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 7, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 8, in Amman, 
Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with TODA 1, in 
Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 
3, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 6, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with 
TODA 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview 
with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); 
Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with Dato 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 
2009); Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 
22, 2009); Interview with JGLP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with IKSA 1, in Amman, Jordan 
(May 23, 2009).  
64 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, IRAQI REFUGEE REGISTRATION DATA ANALYSIS 2007-2008 (2009) 
[hereinafter UNHCR IRAQI REFUGEE DATA ANALYSIS REPORT]. 
65  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STRATEGY FOR THE IRAQ SITUATION (2007), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45b6258b4.pdf (stating that registration will enable UNHCR to determine 
what other protection or assistance intervention may be required). 
66 Interview with IKJG 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009). See also Interview with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan 
(May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009). 
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I am happy I will be in America because it will be safe and I will feel settled.  But I 
am scared.  Where will I go if I am hungry?  At least I know in Iraq, if I were hungry, 
I could go knock on my neighbor’s door and ask for some food.  But there, what can 
I do? . . . I am going to the unknown.  I may get there and think, Jordan is better for 
me . . . .67 
 
For many who enter the resettlement system, the process is further complicated by a 
USRAP that seems labyrinthine and impersonal.  One refugee, Hamza, told researchers, “At 
all these meetings they never gave me any dates, just told me to wait for their call. At one 
point I missed a call because I was in the bathroom and as a consequence my meeting got 
postponed.”68  Although Hamza was eventually resettled to Maryland, the unpredictability of 
the USRAP makes each stage more uncertain for those whose cases are being processed.  
 
Some refugees have even declined offers of resettlement to the United States after hearing 
stories of struggle and despair from family and friends already resettled there.69  As Riaz, 
who has serious health issues, said, “I didn’t reject America because it is America.  I 
rejected it because the life is hard.  We aren’t lazy people.  I like to work.”70  Similarly, Riaz 
believes that the limited health and employment assistance would not be enough to allow 
him to live with his asthma. “If I can work, it would have to be behind a desk, and I don’t 
know what options are available,” he explained.71  Of those who had refused or were 
considering refusing resettlement to the United States, fear of inadequate support was 
common. 
 
Other refugees have declined to be resettled in the United States as a result of the trauma 
of war.  Amira said that many Iraqis see America as the occupier and that her son “would 
shake from fear for a year from the American soldiers.”72  Amira also worries that a military 
draft would force her or her children to fight against Muslims or Arabs.73  These sentiments 
were echoed in several interviews with refugees in Amman, where despite a dire need for 
assistance, some refugees found it difficult to see the United States as their protector.74 
 
In the end, most refugees interviewed who were seeking resettlement wanted to go to the 
United States, despite the risks.75  The fundamental hopefulness of stories like Naima’s 
                                                 
67 Interview with TODA 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).  
68 Interview with IKSF 1, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 13, 2009).  
69 Interview with IKJG 3, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 6, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); 
Interview with IKJG 9, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); 
Interview with DATO 4, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009). 
70 Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).  
71 Id. 
72 Interview with TODA 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).  
73 Id. 
74 Id. (stated that people don’t want to go because they see America as the occupier); See also Interview with IKJG 
2, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKGJ 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009).  
75 For the 14 of 20 refugees who wanted resettlement in the United States, see Interview with IKJG 4, in Amman, 
Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with TODA 2, in 
Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 
4, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 6, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with 
DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview 
with DATO 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); 
Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with IKJG 10, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 
2009); Interview with JGLP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with JGLP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 
23, 2009). For those who either rejected an offer of resettlement from the United States or who would prefer to 
accept an offer of resettlement to another country, see Interview with IKJG 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); 
Interview with IKJG 6, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 
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show that resettlement is still a serious option and that vulnerable Iraqi refugees continue 
to seek resettlement in the United States.  At the same time, Naima’s story shows that 
refugees are seriously considering whether to be resettled to the United States or remain in 
Jordan under extremely difficult conditions.  While the situation in Jordan is quite bad for 
many Iraqi refugees, the news of struggling friends and family in the United States is 
causing more and more Iraqi refugees to wonder whether choosing resettlement is really 
worth the risk. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2009); Interview with IKSA 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 
22, 2009); Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).  
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IV. THE USRAP DOES NOT PROVIDE A DURABLE SOLUTION FOR MOST IRAQI 
REFUGEES  
 
Despite the dire conditions in countries of first asylum, many Iraqi refugees who choose to 
be resettled are also finding difficult conditions in the United States.  Some resettled Iraqi 
refugees said that their situation has gotten so bad that they feel they have no choice but to 
leave the United States to return their country of first asylum.  As this report illustrates, the 
Iraqi refugee situation in the United States is the result of systemic flaws in the USRAP, 
which generally inhibit the program’s ability to promote long-term self-sufficiency and 
integration.  For Iraqi refugees, promoting long-term self-sufficiency and integration means 
providing adequate assistance of a sufficient duration in order to allow them to find and 
keep meaningful employment.  Promoting long-term self-sufficiency also means making 
sure refugees have access to proper treatment for physical and mental health conditions.   
 
When the USRAP does not adequately promote long-term self-sufficiency for resettled Iraqi 
refugees, it not only fails to fulfill its moral obligations, but it also compromises its legal 
obligations.  International and domestic law generally require support for long-term self-
sufficiency.  For example, the Refugee Act was established in part to provide “for the basic 
needs (including food, clothing, shelter, and transportation for job interviews and training) 
of each refugee resettled . . . .”76  Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
guarantees all persons, including resettled refugees, “a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services.”77 The Refugee Convention and Protocol require 
that refugees be provided adequate public assistance and social services.78 
 
Despite such obligations, the research team found that the U.S. anti-poverty approach to 
refugee resettlement adopted by the USRAP does not promote the long-term self-sufficiency 
of refugees.  It does not break down barriers to sustainable employment, employment 
services are not properly funded, English language training is insufficient, transportation is 
inadequate, and professional recertification is not viable.  These shortcomings result in low 
employment rates for Iraqi refugees.  Cash assistance is insufficient, both in amount and 
duration, to allow refugees to support themselves.  Finally, the USRAP makes it difficult for 
refugees to secure medical care, and treatment options are insufficient to address the 
serious mental health issues affecting many Iraqis. 
 
Furthermore, poor planning and coordination throughout the USRAP amplify the problems 
that refugees face.  The USRAP does not base funding on current or future refugee flows, 
but on past refugee flows, leaving programs underfunded. Secondary migration is not 
tracked in real-time, further preventing the USRAP from targeting resources to actual need 
in secondary migration destinations.  Pre-resettlement processing takes little account of 
post-resettlement needs when gathering information about individual refugees.  
 
 
A. The USRAP Does Not Adequately Promote the Long-Term Self-Sufficiency and 
Integration of Iraqi Refugees  
 
Most Iraqi refugees interviewed were struggling to become self-sufficient despite a strong 
desire to work and provide for themselves and their families.  As new arrivals in this 
country, most lacked the necessary tools or skills, or both, to secure sustainable 
                                                 
76 INA § 412(b)(7)(D). 
77 UDHR, supra note 7, art. 25. 
78 Refugee Convention, supra 6, arts. 23-24. 
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employment.  Without adequate employment services, English language training, vocational 
training, professional recertification, and transportation, obtaining and maintaining a job 
was nearly impossible.  In addition, the cash assistance received was not enough to cover 
basic expenses and often ran out long before employment was secured.  Although many of 
the refugees interviewed had physical and mental health issues that were taken into 
account when the United States decided to resettle them, they were not able to access 
appropriate health care after they arrived.   
 
Many Iraqi refugees in the United States are deeply worried about their futures.  Some have 
become homeless or face homelessness;79 others have recounted stories of Iraqis returning 
to countries of first asylum in search of a sustainable life.80  With changes to the USRAP, the 
circumstances of Iraqi refugees could be vastly improved.  
 
i) Resettled Iraqi Refugees Want to Work, but the USRAP Is Not Providing Them with the 
Necessary Tools to Secure Sustainable Employment 
 
When researchers met Farrah, a former physical education teacher with a bachelor's 
degree, she said that all she and her elderly mother hope for is “enough help to get on 
[their] own two feet.”81   After fleeing from Iraq to Syria in 2007, Farrah arrived in Detroit in 
June 2008 and has been trying unsuccessfully to find a job and enroll at a community 
college to improve her employment prospects.82  “We don’t want to depend on the 
government for everything,” Farrah said; “we want a foundation to build our own future.”83 
 
Unfortunately for Farrah, and other Iraqi refugees with whom researchers spoke, the USRAP 
does not devote enough attention to breaking down key barriers to employment for 
refugees.  Employment services, provided by volags and state agencies, are seriously 
underfunded and unable to adequately help Iraqi refugees in their job search.  Lack of 
transportation remains a significant barrier to securing and maintaining employment.  
English as a Second Language (ESL) classes, generally inadequate in both quality and 
duration, fail to help Iraqis build marketable language skills.  In addition, the opportunity to 
pursue education and re-certification programs, prerequisites for many jobs, is either 
unavailable or eclipsed by more immediate needs.  Given these barriers, it is not surprising 
that the vast majority of Iraqi refugees interviewed were unemployed despite expressing a 
strong desire to work. 
 
While the thirty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed in Detroit had already lived in the United 
States for an average of six and one-half months, only two had found employment.84  Many 
complained that their attempts to secure employment remained fruitless.  Caseworkers who 
have worked with hundreds of Iraqi refugees confirmed that unemployment is pervasive and 
has been increasing since the beginning of the economic downturn.  Interviews with volags 
in San Diego revealed that the employment rate for Iraqi refugees at the eight-month mark 
has dropped from between sixty to seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent since mid-
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2008.85  The IRC, which conducted investigations in Atlanta and Phoenix, similarly reported 
unusually high levels of unemployment amongst Iraqi refugees.86 
 
As the situation worsens for Iraqi refugees, they continue to express a desire to work and 
become self-sufficient.  An Iraqi family of five in Detroit provides a telling example.  Mr. 
Aboud, a 50-year-old father and veterinarian who translated for the U.S. military in Iraq, 
and Mrs. Aboud, a 50-year-old mother and physician, have both been told by their volag 
caseworker that they are too old and overqualified for the few jobs available, despite their 
willingness to work for minimum wage in any capacity.87  They bought a car and enrolled in 
the MG program, but they were nevertheless told that their job search would be fruitless.88  
Still, they were not deterred.  “I can work as an assistant or a caregiver,” said Mr. Aboud; “I 
don’t care.”89   
 
But Mr. and Mrs. Aboud, and the many other Iraqi refugees who, like them, are new to the 
United States, must be given the tools necessary to become self-sufficient.  They need 
access to meaningful, well-funded employment services, adequate English language 
training, vocational training or professional re-certification, and reasonable transportation 
options.  The USRAP does not currently provide Iraqi refugees with sufficient access to these 
basic services, creating barriers to long-term self-sufficiency and integration. 
 
 a) Underfunded and Misguided Employment Services 
 
“We need more funding, that’s the key,” said Belmin Pinjic, Director of Refugee Services at 
Lutheran Social Services of Michigan (LSSM), which implements the ORR’s employment 
services grant.  Pinjic emphasized that the issue is not only a dearth of available jobs in 
today’s fragile economy but also the lack of quality services for refugees.90  “We can’t 
change the economy, but if we have appropriate funding, we can have more frontline people 
that provide adequate services,” said Pinjic.91  And this, he concluded, is what will help Iraqi 
refugees get jobs.92    
 
Last year, LSSM received funding to provide employment services for 300 refugees, but 
ended up serving more than 1,200; the average caseload per caseworker increased from 30 
to 120 refugees.93  One LSSM caseworker interviewed had 180 open cases.94  As a result of 
large caseloads, caseworkers are more inclined to provide cursory services when helping 
refugees search for employment.95 
 
The inadequate funding of employment services has real effects on a refugee’s ability to 
secure employment.  Aseil and her husband, Fiaz, who resettled in the D.C. area, described 
their employment services caseworker as a kind and friendly woman. However, Aseil said 
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her caseworker “doesn’t have enough time to handle all the required tasks.”96  
Consequently, Aseil has been trying to look for jobs on her own, but she does not know 
where to look.97  Fiaz, who used to work for the United Nations, reported that despite his 
repeated requests for help with his job search, his caseworker has done little more than 
help him draft a resume.98  Instead, Fiaz has heard about job opportunities from friends.99  
“I’ll take any job I can get,” said Fiaz; “I just want to be self-sufficient.”100    
 
b) Lack of Adequate English Language Training 
 
Shada, who fled Iraq after her husband was killed while working with the U.S. military, has 
a bachelor’s degree in computer science.101  With three children to raise on her own, she 
has no time to pursue professional re-certification.102  Instead, she says that she would be 
happy to work at the front desk of a hotel, if only her English was good enough.103  
 
Many Iraqi refugees, including Shada, told researchers that if they could only speak English 
well, they would have a real chance at getting a job.104  Similarly, refugee caseworkers cited 
lack of English language skills as the number one reason Iraqi refugees are unable to secure 
sustainable employment.  Moreover, statistical analyses of refugee resettlement in Houston, 
Miami, and Sacramento, have shown that refugees arriving with English language skills tend 
to have increased incomes, as do refugees who receive ESL services.105 
 
U.S. regulations set aside specific funding for English language training and require that it 
be provided to the maximum extent feasible, in a manner that is culturally and linguistically 
compatible with a refugee's language and cultural background.106  But in reality, refugees 
have difficulty accessing English language training, the quality of instruction is poor, and 
there are simply not enough classes available for all refugees. 
 
In Detroit, LSSM only has enough funding to start new ESL courses every four months. 
Therefore, newly-arrived refugees commonly wait two or three months before beginning 
classes.107 These classes are only available to a minority of the incoming refugee 
population; there are just 325 seats available due to funding based on the area’s relatively 
small refugee population prior to the recent wave of Iraqi arrivals.108  Those refugees lucky 
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enough to enroll in the LSSM courses only have two hours of class, two to three days a 
week for three months.109  This is hardly enough to prepare refugees for employment. 
 
Moreover, the quality English language training available often prevents refugees from 
acquiring a working knowledge of English.  “ESL classes need to be better,” said the director 
of U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants in Detroit, a volag affiliate, who worries 
that Iraqi refugees are being turned away from jobs because they do not speak English 
well.110  Many ESL instructors are volunteer teachers without a prepared curriculum, 
classroom discussions are often conducted in Arabic instead of English, and learning 
materials fail to take into account the limited literacy of students in any language, even 
Arabic.111   
 
The USRAP could do better.  By comparison, the Australian government funds an Adult 
Migrant English Program (AMEP), which guarantees 610 hours of free English classes to 
refugees, and 910 hours to refugees under the age of twenty-five with low levels of 
schooling.112  All migrants who do not have functional English, including refugees, must 
register for AMEP within three months of arriving in Australia and must begin classes with 
twelve months at one of nearly 250 AMEP locations.113  To meet the unique needs of 
refugees and other migrants, AMEP classes can be taken at home through either a distance 
learning curriculum or one-on-one home tutoring by trained volunteers.114  The Australian 
government also funds a twenty-four-hour translation and interpretation hotline that is free 
when communicating with government, healthcare, and non-profit service providers.115  The 
hotline provides access to over 1,300 interpreters who speak over 120 languages.116 
 
c) Reasonable Transportation Options Not Available 
 
Suri, an Iraqi refugee resettled in Detroit, had been a seamstress in Iraq and was fortunate 
to land an interview for a housekeeping job.117 Unfortunately, she was unable to arrange 
transportation to the interview, and she lost a rare opportunity.118  Like many resettled Iraqi 
refugees, Suri has found the lack of adequate transportation to be a major barrier to 
achieving self-sufficiency. 
 
Even if English classes and job opportunities were widely available, many refugees would 
have great difficulty getting to them.119  The ORR guidelines require that volag caseworkers 
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provide transportation, but resources are sparse, particularly in Detroit and San Diego, the 
two cities receiving the most Iraqi refugees. 120  Making matters worse, public transportation 
is extremely limited in these two cities.  Consequently, refugees are forced to constantly 
rely on friends and family, often refugees themselves, to drive them.  One caseworker said 
that some Iraqi refugees are so desperate to get to their jobs that they pay people to drive 
them.121   
 
Obtaining a driver’s license was especially problematic for many of the refugees in this 
study.122  One caseworker reported that it takes two to five months to get a license, with 
the extensive delay often due to inconsistent romanization of Arabic names on U.S.-issued 
identification, such as the employment-authorization document.123  A single misspelled 
letter of a refugee’s name on a particular document can delay the process for months.124  
Inconsistency between travel documents sometimes requires refugees to wait for their 
employment authorization before they can obtain a driver’s license, forcing refugees into a 
Catch-22, as they cannot find employment without being able to drive to job interviews. 
 
Adapting to the Circumstances 
 
LSSM is currently applying for supplemental funding for a shuttle bus program, whereby 
vans and drivers would be available to take refugees to job interviews, English language 
classes, health screenings, and to apply for Social Security numbers.125 ACCESS, a 
community service provider in Detroit, has also applied for an Ethnic Community Self-Help 
Grant to use in part for transportation; however, funding for such programs is extremely 
limited.126 
 
d) Little Access to Vocational Training and Re-Certification 
 
Hamza, an Iraqi refugee resettled in D.C., was told in Jordan that recertification would be 
easy.  "As a doctor, I know that I have to go through a recertification process in order to 
work,” Hamza said.127  “I asked them about getting recertified as a doctor, [and] [t]hey told 
me I could easily get a job in my field," he further explained.128  After Hazma arrived in the 
United States, his volag told him to get his credentials reviewed by the World Education 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with AWLP 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with LPAW/RW 1, in 
Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with  LPAW/RW 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with AWKS 
1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009); Interview with AWKS 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009); Interview with 
AWKS 3, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009); Interview with AWKS 5, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009); Interview 
with AWKS 7, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009); Interview with RWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009). But see 
Interview with AWLP 3, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009). (Stated able to buy a car from other refugees through 
payment in installments; proudly declared, “We are no longer paralyzed.”).  
120 See 45 C.F.R. § 400.154(h) (2006). 
121 Interview with Fadi Yousif, Employment Services Case Worker, Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Mich., Detroit, Mich. 
(March 13, 2009). 
122  Interview with GPRW 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 10, 2009); Interview with GPRW 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 10, 
2009); Interview with LPAW 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009); Interview with AWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 
2009); Interview with AWKS 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009);  Interview with AWKS 4, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 
13, 2009); Interview with AWKS 7, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009); Interview with RWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar 
13, 2009). 
123 Interview with Fadi Yousif, Employment Services Case Worker, Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Mich., Detroit, Mich. 
(March 13, 2009). 
124 Interview with Mazin Hana, Director, Kurdish Human Rights Watch, Detroit, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009).  
125 Interview with Belmin Pinjic, Dir. of Refugee Serv., Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Mich., in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 10, 
2009). 
126 Interview with Amne Talab, Director, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv., in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 
2009). 
127 Interview with IKSF 1, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 13, 2009). 
128 Id. 
 25 
Services (WES), which he did for a fee of $400.129  It turned out, however, that the 
Education Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) does not accept WES 
verifications, so the $400 was wasted.  Instead, ECFMG requires candidates to pay an initial 
registration fee of $700 and to complete three stages of verification within five years.130  
The first stage is an exam that costs $825; the second, an exam that costs $1200; and the 
third stage includes a residency period and another exam.131  For Hamza, the re-certification 
process proved too difficult and expensive to pursue.132  
 
The USRAP’s focus on immediate employment incentivizes caseworkers to push Iraqi 
refugees towards lower-paying and less sustainable jobs, irrespective of the refugee’s 
professional and educational accomplishments.  Moreover, the limited duration of public 
assistance makes pursuing recertification, vocational training, and higher education 
untenable without financial aid from the government. But for those few people who do seek 
recertification, vocational training, or higher education the payoff can be great.  
 
ii) The USRAP Is Not Providing Iraqi Refugees with Adequate Cash Assistance While They 
Search for Sustainable Employment 
 
In 2006, Haifa’s husband and son were kidnapped in Iraq because of their religion, forcing 
Haifa to flee to Jordan.133  In March, Haifa, in her early fifties, faced yet another seemingly 
insurmountable challenge: having resettled in Detroit nearly eight months prior, her modest 
cash assistance through the USRAP was to expire in April.134  Taking care of her elderly 
mother, who was resettled with her, Haifa did not have a job, did not speak English, and did 
not have access to reliable transportation.135  She was already relying on relatives to help 
pay for her basic expenses, and Haifa did not know what would happen once the refugee 
assistance payments stopped.  “We [have already] lost everything,” she said frankly.136  
“Give us more than eight months to build our lives.”137 
 
If Iraqi refugees desire self-sufficiency, why is the system not working?  On its face, the 
USRAP is intended to assist refugees with their basic needs for as long the government 
deems it necessary in order “to achieve economic self-sufficiency.”138  Indeed, at its 
inception, and in the midst of a prolonged recession, the USRAP assisted Vietnamese 
refugees for thirty six months.  The results speak for themselves: by 2007, the median 
household income for Vietnamese Americans – the large majority of whom entered the 
United States as refugees – was $54,871.  In the same year, only 3.2% of Vietnamese 
American households were receiving cash public assistance.139  In addition, the hundreds of 
thousands of Vietnamese refugees who were assisted for thirty six months in the 1970s and 
1980s were able to pursue opportunities for upward mobility, knowing their families would 
be cared for.  Today, forty-one percent of Vietnamese Americans have either some college 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Interview with AWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11 2009). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 INA § 412 (a)(1)(A)(i). 
139 U.S. Census Bureau (data extracted from 1-year American Community Survey), available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en.  Approximately two-thirds of all Vietnamese 
Americans entered the U.S. as refugees.  See SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOURCE ACTION CENTER, SOUTHEAST ASIAN AMERICAN 
STATISTICAL PROFILE (2004), available at http://www.searac.org/seastatprofilemay04.pdf. 
 26 
education or an associate’s degree, and twenty-seven percent, just half a percent below the 
national average, hold at least a bachelor’s degree.140    
 
Despite this past model, which laid a foundation for the success of Vietnamese refugees, 
today’s refugees are expected to achieve self-sufficiency while facing another prolonged 
recession in eight months and with minimal assistance.141  This short period of assistance 
reflects the overwhelming emphasis on immediate employment in the Refugee Act and its 
subsequent implementation through anti-poverty programs such as Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid.  However, modeling refugee assistance on anti-
poverty programs is misguided.  Refugees who have fled persecution in foreign countries 
face an utterly different set of challenges than do U.S. residents struggling with poverty.  In 
addition to struggling with poverty themselves, refugees must rebuild their lives in a foreign 
country, learn a new language and adapt to a new way of life.  Iraqi refugees, in particular, 
often arrive to find that their educational degrees are useless and years of professional 
experience are of no value.  
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Not Even Eight Months 
 
Although the Refugee Act calls for up to thirty six months of assistance, refugees today 
often receive fewer than eight months.  In Michigan, a refugee who goes to the Department 
of Human Services (DHS) on the day of her arrival must wait at least ten days for an 
appointment with a Refugee Specialist who can open her case.  If the refugee has 
satisfactorily completed the application form, her case may be opened that day, but the 
DHS policy requires an additional thirty-day wait before any payments can be sent to the 
refugee.  When the refugee receives her first payment forty days after arriving, it does not 
include back payment for those forty days.  In the best-case scenario, a refugee in Michigan 
receives a maximum of approximately six months and ten days of cash assistance.142  
 
However, the DHS often does not immediately open the case and begin the thirty-day count 
because refugees are hesitant to include all the requisite information on the application form 
when they are living with family or friends who are also refugees.  These host families—
many of whom are refugees and receive their own Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) or TANF 
benefits—believe they will lose their assistance if the family staying with them includes their 
address and other information on the application form.  If information is missing on the 
application form, the DHS delays opening a refugee’s case despite the fact that the 
information is readily available in its own database.  DHS Refugee Specialists have also 
reported delays as a result of private agents who falsely promise new refugees a faster 
turnaround in the processing of their cases. 
 
By contrast, refugees placed in San Diego are resettled under the Wilson-Fish program, 
which gives volags full responsibility and funding to provide the first eight months of 
services and cash assistance.  State agencies already overburdened with serving longtime 
state residents are not further inundated with refugee caseloads, assistance is available to 
refugees from day one, and volags are able to utilize the full extent of the ORR funding, as 
opposed to state and county agencies where ten to fifteen percent of federal funds are used 
for administrative costs.143   While longer periods of assistance are needed, such programs 
avoid some of the problems refugees face in other regions. 
 
Many Iraqi refugees facing the prospect of life without a job worry about how they are going 
to survive on the minimal government assistance provided.  The Attars, a family of six, live 
in a humble apartment just outside Detroit.144  Their oldest son attends English classes, but 
because he is a legal adult at the age of nineteen, the Attars now only qualify for the level 
of assistance assigned to a family of five under TANF.  Receiving approximately $700 per 
month, the Attars can barely afford their $600 monthly rent, not including utilities.145  
Although the Attars receive some help from their local church and bishop in the form of food 
baskets and furniture, it is certainly not enough to pay for another expense common to all 
refugees resettled here: the $175 they owe each month to reimburse IOM for their airline 
tickets from Syria to the United States.146 
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As it exists now, the total package of assistance to refugees amounts to between just 
seventeen to forty percent of the federal poverty line.147  Although a family of six may 
receive up to $2,500 in R&P assistance to cover living costs for the first ninety days, a single 
adult receives only $425, or less than $5 a day.148  Refugees who do not have family 
already in the United States sometimes do not receive any direct R&P cash assistance 
because volags can use that money to pay the first-month housing expenses.149  In some 
cases, these refugees leave their initial housing situation because they find the living 
situation culturally untenable; one mother and her young daughter left their initial housing 
placement because the mother believed it was inappropriate for them to share a bathroom 
with eight other refugees, some of whom were adult males from different countries.150  In 
such cases, the R&P assistance used to pay their rent cannot be recovered. 
 
As the Attars’ situation illustrates, cash assistance, either through RCA or TANF, is also 
insufficient.  A family of five in Detroit will receive $698 per month, but they are forced to 
pay a $600 rent to comply with local housing laws that require five people to live in a three-
bedroom home.151  In San Diego, a family of four receives $862 per month, but the rent for 
a two-bedroom apartment is $850.152  Similarly, a 2008 ORR report found that refugees 
living in communities that provide low welfare benefits, such as Houston and Miami, “cannot 
subsist on public assistance.”153  Without the ability to save money, refugees then struggle 
to cover important incidental costs, such adjusting to legal permanent resident status.154    
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The Right to Adequate Housing 
 
Article 25 of the UDHR provides that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control.”155  Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”156   
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, who authoritatively interprets the 
ICESCR, has defined these provisions, in which the right to adequate housing is embedded, 
to include several core elements.  Among them are:157   
• Affordability: “Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at 
such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened 
or compromised.”158   
• Location: “[A]dequate housing must be in a location which allows access to employment 
options, health-care services, schools, child-care centers and other social facilities. This 
is true both in large cities and in rural areas where the temporal and financial costs of 
getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands upon the budgets of 
poor households.”159   
 
iii) The USRAP Is Not Providing Adequate Medical Care to Resettled Refugees, Further 
Undermining Their Ability to Secure Long-term Self-sufficiency   
 
Just as refugees receive only eight months of cash assistance, so too are they limited to 
eight months of medical coverage under Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA).160  This is 
problematic not only because many refugees are unable to find jobs in eight months, but 
also because they often face unique medical needs that do not go away when they are able 
to support themselves.161  Indeed, Iraqi refugees need access to quality health care that will 
cover treatment for long-term physical ailments, as well as the serious mental health issues 
that many of them face.   
                                                 
155 UDHR, supra note 7. While the UDHR was not drafted as a legally binding text, many of its provisions have 
subsequently been articulated in binding treaties and many argue that it now reflects customary international law.     
156 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Art. 11(1), Dec. 16, 1966. The United States 
has signed the ICESCR but has not yet ratified it.  Although this means that the Covenant is not part of U.S. law, 
as a signatory to the Covenant the United States is bound under international law to “refrain from acts that would 
defeat the object and purpose of” the ICESCR. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art.18(a), May 23, 
1969; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. Department of State,  
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm. (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).    
157 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of 
the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991). available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/469f4d91a9378221c12563ed0053547e?Opendocument. 
158 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of 
the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991). available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/469f4d91a9378221c12563ed0053547e?Opendocument. 
159 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of 
the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991). available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/469f4d91a9378221c12563ed0053547e?Opendocument. 
160 The refugee resettlement program provides eight months of medical assistance.  See ORR Guidelines at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/cma.htm. 
161 See Medicaid eligibility guidelines at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/02_AreYouEligible_.asp#TopOfPage. 
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 a) Inadequate Access to Medical Care 
 
Seema is a 56-year-old self-described optimist from northern Iraq who has grown to love 
Michigan.162  She has a heart problem, high cholesterol, rheumatism, and no medical 
coverage because her RMA expired after eight months.163  Her elderly husband is also sick, 
and their adult son earns minimum wage.164  But still, Seema is lucky: hers is one of the 
few Iraqi refugee families with any wage at all, not to mention her husband’s social security 
benefits.165  She only asks for her medical coverage to be restored. “We can handle 
everything else,” said Sema.166  Seema’s story is illustrative of a broader phenomenon: 
healthy Iraqi refugees, just like healthy Americans, are better positioned to find and keep 
jobs, and tend to perform better in their jobs.   
 
A recent UNHCR study of active Iraqi refugee cases reported that between twenty-five and 
forty-one percent of registered Iraqi refugees have an “important medical condition.”167  
Moreover, the coordinator of the ACCESS Community Health Clinic reported that many Iraqi 
refugees suffer from chronic conditions, like diabetes, that require regular treatment.168  
Still, the USRAP makes little effort to address these specific and often long-term healthcare 
needs.  Adult refugees without dependent children stand on the edge of a particularly steep 
cliff at the eight-month mark because they cannot extend their medical coverage by 
transferring to Medicaid, which only covers families with dependent children.   
 
The same problems that plague other elements of the USRAP are especially acute when it 
comes to medical treatment.  Refugee service providers reported that many Iraqi refugees 
are unable to fill out application or renewal forms in English,169 and some had missed 
appointments for check-ups and medical procedures because they simply had no means of 
getting to them.170  As when applying for cash assistance, many Iraqi refugees who live with 
other refugee families are hesitant to apply for medical coverage because host families are 
worried their own coverage will then be discontinued.171  In such cases, a refugee may 
postpone treatment of urgent healthcare needs until she can obtain her own living 
arrangements. 
 
Misinformation and administrative hurdles also prevent refugees from accessing a full eight 
months of healthcare coverage.  Both refugees and healthcare providers are often unaware 
that Medicaid coverage applies even before a refugee has received her Medicaid card.172  
This is dangerously problematic for the large number of Iraqi refugees who have existing 
                                                 
162 Interview with AWKS 4, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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166 Id. 
167 UNHCR IRAQI REFUGEE DATA ANALYSIS REPORT, supra note 54. 
168 Interview with Michele Sanchez, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr,, in 
Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
169 Interview with Father Shara, Representative to Mich. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Arab Chaldean Council, Detroit, 
Mich, Mar. 13, 2009 (discussing the extent to which lack of English language ability affected a refugee’s ability to 
properly fill out benefit forms). 
170 Interview with Shorouq Shenaq, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr,, in 
Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
171 See, e.g., Interview with KSGP/RW 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009); Interview with AWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. 
(Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with AWLP 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with AWKS 1, in Detroit, 
Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009). See also Denise Schoop and Martina Ward, Refugee Specialists, Mich. Dep’t. of Human 
Serv., in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2009). 
172 Interview with Fadia Nouman and AbdilKhalik Thabit, Caseworkers, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and 
Soc. Serv., in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
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medical conditions when they arrive but are unable to seek treatment, except in emergency 
rooms.  To make matters worse, medical coverage in Michigan begins not on the day of 
arrival, but rather on the first day of the month of arrival.  For a refugee who arrives in the 
United States on June 30, her coverage is considered to have begun on June 1, thereby 
cutting one of the eight months of eligibility for medical assistance.173 
 
The Attar family, for example, was unable to access Medicaid until a full two months after 
they arrived in the United States.174 Having initially moved in with relatives, they hesitated 
to apply for Medicaid because their relatives were on public assistance and were afraid of 
losing their own benefits if the Attars used their home address to apply.175  With two discs 
removed from his spine, Mr. Attar applied for disability support, but his doctor told him to 
come back in six months to receive the necessary disability referral.176  When the Attars’ 
son turned nineteen, he no longer qualified for the family’s Medicaid coverage and cash 
assistance, and they worry that the same will happen to their eighteen-year-old daughter, 
who has a medical condition.177  
 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health 
 
Several human rights instruments guarantee the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health.  Chief among these is the UDHR, which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the 
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”178  The ICESCR, another core 
human rights document, provides “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”179 In General Comment 14, the ICESCR 
Committee, which interprets the treaty, defined this right to include several core elements, 
including physical accessibility.  According to the Committee, “health facilities, goods and 
services must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population, especially 
vulnerable or marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and indigenous populations, 
women, children, adolescents, older persons, persons”180 
 
The right is also identified in of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),181 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),182 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).183 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 See, e.g., Interview with AWLP 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009).  
174 Interview with KSGP/RW 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
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178 UDHR, supra note 7. 
179 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 1966. 
180 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4, (2000). available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/40d009901358b0e2c1256915005090be?Opendocument. 
181 International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 5(e)(iv), Dec. 21, 1965. 
182 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 11(1)(f), 12, Dec. 18, 1979.  
183 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989. The United States has signed the CRC but has not 
yet ratified it.  
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 b) Inadequate Treatment for Mental Health Issues 
 
Saeed lives in Detroit now, but the scars around his ankles are a constant reminder of the 
repeated torture and electric shocks he suffered in Iraq. 184   Saeed is not alone; every year, 
thousands of refugees arrive in the United States with mental health needs, but every year, 
federal funding under the Torture Victims Relief Act is insufficient.185  This is particularly 
troubling since the very fact of being a torture victim is what qualifies many refugees for 
resettlement in the United States. 
 
A study conducted by the United Nations in Syria concluded that one in five Iraqi refugees 
are victims of torture or traumatic violence, seventy-seven percent have been affected by 
bombings, eighty percent have witnessed a shooting, and seventy-five percent “knew 
someone who had been killed.”186  Interviews conducted for this report confirmed this high 
incidence of traumatic experience and associated mental health conditions.  A doctor who 
carries out refugee medical assessments in Detroit estimated that seventy-five percent of 
Iraqi refugees he sees have mental health issues.187  A refugee specialist at the ACCESS 
Community Health and Research Center in Dearborn, Michigan, told us that seventy to 
seventy-five percent of Iraqi refugees show signs of mental health issues such as insomnia 
or the post-trauma effects of having witnessed a shooting.188 
 
And yet in many cases, refugees’ mental health needs remain untreated, compromising 
their ability to lead healthy, functional lives. In San Diego, for example, refugees with 
lingering mental health problems can wait two months before seeing a doctor.189  Similarly, 
torture treatment centers in the eight states with the highest number of Iraqi refugee 
arrivals are experiencing waitlists for their services.190  Other areas where Iraqi refugees are 
expected to resettle in greater numbers, such as Idaho, Tennessee, and upstate New York, 
do not have any dedicated torture treatment centers and will therefore require additional 
funding for training and capacity-building.191  This lack of adequate funding allows for only a 
very rudimentary mental health assessment to be conducted at a refugee’s initial health 
screening.  In Dearborn, the only available practitioner to conduct the assessment was a 
volunteer medical intern.192 
 
Additional barriers to treating torture survivors and those with serious mental health issues 
exist.  A community health professional said that medical records she received are often 
illegible or otherwise useless for identifying mental health issues.193  Also, Iraqis often 
                                                 
184 Interview with RWGP 3, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 10, 2009). 
185 Torture Victims Relief Act, 22 U.S.C. 2152 (2003). The Center for Victims of Torture estimates that the TVRA 
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190 See Center for Victims of Torture Website, http://www.cvt.org/page/40. 
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192 Interview with Shorouq Shenaq, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr, in 
Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
193 Interview with Michele Wells, Director of Human Resources, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. 
Health & Research Ctr, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
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stigmatize individuals thought to have mental health issues and community outreach efforts 
are only beginning to educate this population about the merits of treatment.194 
 
Refugee service providers acknowledge that until refugees’ basic needs – including housing, 
employment, and transportation – are met, a focus on mental health is likely to remain 
elusive.  But meeting those basic needs will do little good if a refugee’s untreated mental 
health condition keeps her from making the most of the opportunities provided by 
resettlement.  The only way around this closed loop is a well-funded resettlement program 
that acknowledges and addresses the connection between a refugee’s physical and mental 
health and her long-term self-sufficiency. 
 
 
B. The USRAP Is Compromised by a Lack of Strategic Planning and Coordination 
 
Every Wednesday in a conference room in Arlington, Virginia, representatives of the volags 
gather to decide where in the United States each refugee in the resettlement queue will 
begin his or her new life.  The discussion is broad, taking into account the circumstances of 
each refugee family as well as local and national capacity. Like other key moments in the 
resettlement process, the information and procedures that lead to or are contingent upon 
these decisions implicate everyone in the system. Though all actors in the resettlement 
process work hard to fulfill their respective mandates, by the time the futures of Iraqi 
refugees are decided in multi-round draft-picks in Arlington, key information is often left by 
the wayside and important opportunities for planning and coordination are missed or 
ignored.  
 
Researchers identified a number of problems with the planning and execution of the USRAP 
that have a deep impact on refugee self-sufficiency.  The USRAP is marked by limited 
strategic planning across and among different parts of the system, and funding and 
placement mechanisms are not flexible enough to anticipate or react to the changing needs 
of refugee populations.  There are no adequate mechanisms in place for anticipating 
foreseeable trends in secondary migration, and information about vulnerabilities impacting 
refugees after resettlement is either not gathered or not shared.  Such shortfalls place 
needless limitations on actors, such as those who attend the weekly placement meeting in 
Arlington, and prevent the system from adequately serving the vulnerable refugees that the 
system is designed to protect.  As a result, refugees resettled to the United States often 
suffer at all stages of the process. 
 
i) USRAP Funding Decisions Are Reactive, Not Proactive 
 
The recent arrival of Iraqi refugees is the most glaring example to date of the USRAP’s 
inability to anticipate future needs.  When the U.S. government announced in 2007 that 
tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees would soon be arriving in the United States, there was 
little doubt that Iraqis would seek to be placed in cities with large existing Iraqi and Arab 
communities like Detroit and San Diego.  Even those working in overseas processing 
predicted as much.195  While the OPEs provide quarterly arrival projections to the PRM, this 
data is not shared with the ORR for purposes of capacity setting.196 
 
                                                 
194 Interview with Shorouq Shenaq, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr, in 
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Moreover, the formula for resource allocation precludes any such planning, even if it were to 
take place.197  Federal funding for social services and employment programs through RSS 
and TAG is dictated by the number of refugee arrivals over the previous three or five years, 
respectively.198  The retroactive nature of this formula funding prevents resources from 
reaching localities with abrupt increases in refugee placement. For example, San Diego 
received approximately 1,500 new refugees each fiscal year before 2008; it is now on track 
to receive over 5,200 in both FY 2009 and FY 2010, over ninety-five percent of whom are 
Iraqi.199  Meanwhile, the number of arrivals for the state of Michigan increased 400% from 
FY 2006 to FY 2008.200 Arrivals to Detroit, all Iraqis, increased by over 1500% for that same 
period.201 But funding for refugee social services only increased by approximately seventy-
two percent from FY 2007 to FY 2009.202 Because arrivals levels from previous years bind 
the formula funding, funding commensurate to these new caseloads will not arrive until 
2011. 
 
In the meantime, the ORR’s support for these struggling locales remains based on the 
fiction that they are serving the number of refugees that arrived in 2006 or 2007.  This 
systemic delay has a serious impact on the ability of service providers to assist refugees, 
and the consequences are dire for refugees.  In some cases, volag staff have become 
responsible for as many as 100 cases at a time, representing three or four times the 
number of clients they had just a few years ago.203 As noted above, the additional strain on 
a caseworker’s time means that individualized attention is nearly impossible to provide, 
contributing to a threefold drop in employment rates in Detroit.204   
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What a Difference a Year Makes 
 
In light of the sudden arrival of thousands of new Iraqi refugees in Detroit, the state of 
Michigan recalibrated the statewide distribution of limited state resources provided by the 
ORR.  Although the total amount of federal funding did not adjust quickly enough to cope 
with Detroit’s new arrivals, the state refugee coordinator took the initiative of allocating 
funding for employment services among counties according to levels from the previous 
year, instead of the previous three years.  This shifted the available resources to the 
employment services in Detroit run by LSSM, away from programs elsewhere in the state 
that had a lesser relative need.  
 
With the new source of funds, LSSM was able to double the number of caseworkers 
committed to employment services, which increased the employment placement rate by 
fifty percent from the last trimester of FY 2008 to the first trimester of FY 2009.205 
 
ii) USRAP Does Not Adequately Account for Secondary Migration  
 
The initial placement decisions for resettled refugees have a significant impact on refugees’ 
long-term self-sufficiency and the efficiency of the program as a whole.  And although the 
PRM, the ORR, and volags each impose their own restrictions on placement, no one agency 
is responsible for refugee placement as a whole, which directly affects refugees’ ability to 
integrate into their new communities. 
 
When refugees are haphazardly placed in communities that lack the necessary resources or 
social supports, barriers to employment become even more pronounced.  If refugees 
relocate to other cities seeking more support or better job opportunities, resettlement 
assistance often lags behind or becomes difficult to access. Such was the case for the 
majority of Iraqi refugee secondary migrants interviewed in Detroit, who spent an average 
of fifty days at their initial placement before moving to Detroit.206  Some of these refugees 
never received their full R&P assistance.207 Without an effective tracking system for 
information sharing between states, volags, the PRM and the ORR, refugees must take the 
initiative to find new social service providers and act to transfer their own cash and medical 
assistance from one state to another.  When they move, refugees get lost in the system, 
losing at least part of their eight months of cash and medical assistance.  
 
With regard to offsetting the effect that secondary migration has on the destination state’s 
resources, there is simply no system-wide tracking mechanism, even though it is an entirely 
predictable and regular occurrence.  The PRM does not track secondary migration because it 
is “not part of their mandate.”208  The ORR attempts to track secondary migration after the 
R&P period through a state reporting mechanism, but it suffers from a delay that renders 
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the information futile; by the time the ORR registers one set of secondary migrants, a new 
set has already arrived.209 
 
Meanwhile, states are left to depend on each other to determine when a case from another 
state requires immediate follow-up.  Volags such as LSSM have tried to collect the names of 
secondary migrants when they arrive, but as the director of LSSM’s refugee service said, 
there is simply no way to know whether its register of over 200 secondary migrants 
represents five or ninety percent of the total population.210  Undoubtedly, these refugees 
place additional strain on already overburdened service networks. 
 
iii) The USRAP Fails to Identify and Communicate Vulnerabilities in Overseas Processing 
 
Many of the problems that plague the placement process are rooted in a breakdown of 
information-sharing across various agencies involved in the USRAP.  Iraqis being processed 
for U.S. resettlement speak with representatives at the UNHCR, IOM, and DHS before 
getting on a flight to the United States.  Nonetheless, there is neither a single mechanism 
for prioritizing cases for expedited processing nor a procedure for recording needs that will 
impact refugees after arrival.  In some cases, information is gathered that is not shared 
with agencies further down the resettlement chain, increasing the likelihood that refugee 
needs will not be met.  
                                                 
209 Form ORR-11 is the mechanism ORR uses to track secondary migrants. The form must be submitted by state 
coordinators on or by December 31 each year and include information for the previous fiscal year (ending 
September 30).  See http://www.hhs.state.ne.us/refugees/docs/training/instructions-for-orr-11.pdf. 
210 Interview with Belmin Pinjic, Dir. of Refugee Serv., Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Mich., in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 10, 
2009). 
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Disjunction between Resettlement and Assistance 
 
Refugee survivors of torture in Amman find themselves in a unique situation: they can be 
identified and treated as a survivor of torture without information about their special needs 
ever reaching the other side of the Atlantic once they are resettled.   
 
In October, 2008, the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) received funding, primarily from 
the PRM and U.N. to open a torture-treatment center for Iraqi refugees. CVT clinicians 
spend months developing relationships and working with survivors of torture and trauma. 211  
“It takes seven to nine sessions to build enough trust for [our] clients to open up about 
these experiences.”212  Victimization rates among Iraqis are disproportionately high, even 
for refugees fleeing conflict, but the CVT believes survivors are unlikely to be forthcoming 
with the UNHCR or IOM interviewers about their experience.213  Furthermore, panel 
physicians designated by the Centers for Disease Control to evaluate immigrants moving to 
the United States are unlikely to report anything other than direct physical evidence of 
torture.214  Thus it is likely that many survivors of torture pass unidentified through the 
USRAP. 
 
Even after they develop this rapport, get details, and begin treatment, however, CVT, an 
organization that runs torture treatment programs in the United States, is unable to follow 
up on these cases post-resettlement.  As the Jordan country director put it, “[we] are only 
really equipped to do email and telephone outreach on individual clients’ behalf on the basis 
of personal relationships.”215  
 
In spite of the fact that the treatment program is a PRM-supported initiative, there is no 
coordination between assistance and resettlement.  There is no formal mechanism for 
information about these survivors of torture and trauma to be fed into the resettlement 
system.  While the CVT “could certainly do some signposting,” the organization nevertheless 
does not refer clients to resettlement because “it’s too labor and resource intensive.”   
Moreover, the CVT is not funded to do resettlement referrals, nor are they charged with 
ensuring that information about their clients follows them to the United States.  Although 
such a responsibility should not fall on the shoulders of the CVT, this vital information 
should be shared to help enhance the resettlement experience of, and care for, Iraqis in the 
United States.216 
 
The disjunction between needs and services – like resettling, or failing to resettle, victims of 
torture in locations with torture treatment centers – begins while a refugee is still in a 
country of first asylum.  The UNHCR collects detailed information for each of its referrals to 
the OPE over the course of three or four interviews.217  This information is then given to the 
OPE, which prepares the case for adjudication by the USCIS.218 At all points in this process, 
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any information that is not digitally captured is hand-recorded by an IOM employee.219  The 
PRM dictates the amount of information that is communicated from the IOM database to the 
volags when making placement decisions and post-arrival.220  
 
At the IOM, the OPE in Amman, there are four points at which a vulnerability could be 
detected: (1) upon referral from the UNHCR, if included in the referral form; (2) during the 
preparation of the file by the IOM, if a refugee identifies a special vulnerability; (3) if the 
caseworker flags something unusual and notes it; or (4) during the medical examination.221  
Notably, there is no formal mechanism for reporting any vulnerability identified by the 
USCIS during its adjudication interview, which occurs between steps three and four above.  
There is no point at which any U.S. government employee or contracted party is tasked with 
investigating and reporting the presence of a needs-related vulnerability for the purposes of 
ensuring post-arrival assistance.  Instead, such information is only gathered to help support 
the individual’s persecution claim. 
 
In addition to points at which vulnerability data would be entered into the record or missed, 
there are four reasons for which cases are expedited for faster processing at the IOM-
Amman: (1) for medical reasons, (2) for protection reasons, (3) for a compelling 
humanitarian need, or (4) if something is overdue.222  Although these four grounds are tied 
to flags within their database, the IOM reported that “more often than not it is just a sticky 
note stuck on someone’s computer to move ‘X’ case along or to the top of the pile for ‘X’ 
reason—or at least keep track of it.”223  In addition to this failure, evaluating whether the 
individual vulnerability merits faster processing is not tied to the vulnerabilities identified 
above. 
 
Intuitively, the medical exam would seem the best avenue for revealing any latent but 
serious conditions.  This exam is required before a refugee is allowed to travel to the United 
States; however, like the DHS interview, its purpose is to verify admissibility, not needs.224  
Because of the speed of processing, the exam is sometimes conducted only after 
information about a refugee has been sent to the volags, who make a placement decision 
without medical records.225  If a volag later finds out that a serious medical condition was 
not previously identified, it sends a “medical anomaly” report to the State Department.226  
This presents serious complications if a refugee must be hastily relocated to a different 
location based on newly-discovered needs or is left in a location without specialized 
services.227  Even when medical records are received, they are often inadequate.  One 
community health professional in Detroit reported that the medical records she receives are 
often illegible or otherwise useless for identifying mental health issues.228  The USRAP must 
                                                 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. IOM felt that UNHCR was in the best position to provide comprehensive information that would be helpful for 
identifying refugee needs post-resettlement.  
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 The medical examination of refugees is conducted in accordance with INA § 212(a)(1), which provides health-
related inadmissibility criteria generally designed to bar admission for aliens with health conditions that could be 
considered some kind of public threat.  See INA §(a)(1)(A).  HHS, in consultation with the CDC, has further 
promulgated regulations that define the content and scope of oversees medical examinations in accordance with 
implementing the health-related inadmissibility criteria. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 34 (2008).   
225 Refugee Allocation Meeting, Arlington, Va. (Apr. 15, 2009). 
226 Id. 
227 Interview with David John and Mark Brown, Int’l Org. for Migration Jordan, in Amman, Jordan. (May 20, 2009). 
228 Interview with Michele Wells, Director of Human Resources, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and 
Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr,, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
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do a better job identifying vulnerabilities and sharing this information with those who will 
ultimately provide the services.229 
 
Unlike countries that intentionally seek refugees on the basis of presumed ability to 
integrate, the USRAP is committed to protecting all UNHCR-referred refugees, making it 
needs-blind.  Refugees are not further screened on the basis of their personal vulnerabilities 
or qualities, and this is commendable. In fact, refugee vulnerabilities are the basis for 
admission.  To the extent that vulnerabilities are captured as part of the adjudication 
process, they are not communicated to volags to ensure quality post-resettlement services. 
Moreover, the resource constraint and speed under which the placement mechanism 
operates further reduces the information that can be collected.  Yet the proper 
identification, transfer, and use of this information is essential for resettled refugees to be 
placed with resources that meet their needs and, by extension, help them to become 
sustainably self-sufficient and achieve long-term integration.  The system can no longer 
afford to turn a blind eye to needs; vulnerabilities and needs must be identified to help 
refugees post-resettlement. 
 
 
                                                 
229 The same structural myopia regarding refugee needs and vulnerabilities extends to refugee strengths and 
qualifications.  Thus the USRAP should also re-tool processing to take into account what characteristics make 
individual refugees more likely to succeed in the United States, ensuring that the system fosters integration by 
addressing special weaknesses and strengths. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The USRAP extends an offer of protection to tens of thousands of the world’s most 
vulnerable refugees each year.  Historically, the program has followed through with this 
commitment.  For too long, however, there has been a myopic focus on the quantity of 
refugees admitted to the detriment of the quality of resettlement.   
 
This report shows that Iraqi refugees recently resettled to the United States are not faring 
well. Most are not securing sustainable employment, and many are not able to support 
themselves or their families on the public assistance they are receiving.  Some have become 
homeless. Iraqi refugees are also suffering from the effects of war: some are torture victims 
and many have serious mental health issues needing treatment. Finally, Iraqi refugees are 
often not able to access medical treatment due to administrative hurdles and insufficient 
funding in the system, further undermining prospects for long-term integration. 
 
In addition to concerns about immediate survival, this report shows that the USRAP is not 
doing enough to enable Iraqi refugees to become sustainably self-sufficient.  Employment 
services are seriously underfunded in areas such as Detroit, where a large proportion of 
Iraqi refugees are resettled.  English language training is also largely insufficient to prepare 
Iraqi refugees for sustainable employment.  Lack of transportation undermines all aspects of 
the resettlement process, including the ability of Iraqi refugees to secure employment.  
Support for recertifying Iraqi refugees or providing vocational training is nearly non-
existent, even though many Iraqi refugees come to the United States with significant 
educational and professional accomplishments.   
 
Lack of planning and information sharing in the USRAP amplifies these problems.  Funding 
mechanisms, especially those designed to fund social and employment services, tend to be 
retroactive: they fund localities that have previously resettled large amounts of refugees 
rather than those that are going resettle large amounts of refugees.  This leads to large 
caseloads for refugee caseworkers, contributing to higher refugee unemployment.  
Secondary migration, a relatively predictable phenomenon, is not adequately tracked.  
Similarly, information regarding a refugee’s unique needs, including medical conditions, is 
often passed on only informally, if at all.  There is simply no system for collecting, 
transferring and acting on refugee information for planning purposes.  At almost every stage 
of processing, the individual parts that make up the USRAP do not see themselves as 
responsible for the long-term protection of refugees but rather only for the small part they 
are doing.  No agency is measuring whether the combined efforts actually protect refugees 
in the long-term.     
 
Yet resettlement of Iraqi refugees remains a vital tool of international refugee protection.  
Iraqi refugees in Jordan and in other countries of first asylum lack important legal rights and 
protections.  They are unable to work legally, and face discrimination and abuse as a result 
of their uncertain circumstances.  Without any prospect of voluntary repatriation in the near 
future, the USRAP remains an important option for many Iraqi refugees.  It is, therefore, 
crucial that the inadequacies of the program be identified and remedied so that resettled 
Iraqi refugees are able to achieve long-term self-sufficiency and integration.  
 
As President Obama said in an April 2009 speech at Georgetown, “We simply cannot 
sacrifice the long-term investments that we so desperately need to generate long-term 
prosperity.  Just as a cash-strapped family may cut back on luxuries but will insist on 
spending money to get their children through college, so we as a country have to make 
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current choices with an eye on the future.”230 The resettlement programs on which Iraqi 
refugees depend while they rebuild their lives are not luxuries; they are the long-term 
investments necessary to fulfill America’s promise to refugees. 
 
 
                                                 
230 Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Speech at Georgetown University (Apr. 14, 2009). 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Continued Resettlement 
a. The United States should continue its commitment to the resettlement of Iraqi 
refugees in numbers at least equal to those admitted during FY 2009.  
b. Cultural orientation programs should be extended and information about 
resettlement should be provided to refugees early in the process and long before 
their departure dates. 
 
Long-Term Self-Sufficiency and Integration 
a. Refugee assistance should ideally be decoupled from mainstream welfare 
programs and tailored to meet the specific needs of refugees. 
b.  Refugee Cash Assistance should be increased to cover all basic expenses and 
extended to eighteen months.  
c. The PRM and ORR should request higher funding levels for refugee admissions 
and services that better reflect the real needs of refugees. 
d. Increased funding should in particular be directed at employment services, 
English language training, transportation services, educational opportunities, 
professional recertification, housing, and medical treatment, including treatment 
for survivors of torture and refugees with post-traumatic stress disorder.  
e. ORR should work with states to identify and remove administrative barriers to 
integration, such as issues with driver’s license applications, social security, 
employment authorization, and unnecessary gaps in cash assistance or medical 
coverage. 
 
Improved Strategic Planning 
a. The White House should clearly identify one lead agency to coordinate all 
agencies and organizations involved in the USRAP. 
b. All relevant agencies and stakeholders should implement planning procedures to 
anticipate the arrival of new groups of refugees, taking into consideration new 
influxes of refugees, vulnerabilities, local services capacity, and secondary 
migration.  
c. Congress should amend the Refugee Act and the ORR should amend its 
regulations so that funding formulas are flexible and can be adapted to new 
resettlement patterns, particularly those used for RSS and TAG.   
d. Whenever possible, funding formulas should not be based on historical trends but 
on prospective refugee arrivals; if past arrivals must be considered, only the 
previous fiscal year should be considered.  
 
Increased Information Gathering and Sharing 
a. The USRAP should implement a holistic review of information gathering and 
sharing procedures to better account for specific refugee populations. 
b. In places where the PRM-funded assistance programs identify information vital to 
resettlement programs, the PRM should institute an information sharing 
mechanism between the two service providers.  
c. The PRM should expand the types and amount of information that is provided to 
U.S. volags before placement to ensure that individuals are resettled to a location 
that is able to provide the best possible care and services.  This may include 
sharing the UNHCR-prepared resettlement registration form or the full panel 
physician report, or both. 
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Enhanced Coordination 
a. The designated lead agency, in consultation with all relevant actors, should 
develop new procedures that outline a common, consistent strategy for the 
placement of individual refugees, taking into account the needs of each refugee, 
state and volag resources, and recent trends prior to a refugee’s arrival. 
b. The PRM should consider creating an individual case management system for 
post-adjudication and pre-departure refugees, which would advise individual 
refugees in light of known post-resettlement administrative hurdles and help 
them anticipate, and prepare for or avoid them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AI - 1 
 APPENDIX I: INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED 
 
Iraqi Refugees 
• Amman, Jordan, 29 refugees 
• Detroit, Michigan, 39 refugees 
• Washington, D.C., 7 refugees 
 
U.S. Government Agencies and Officials 
• County of San Diego, Health and Human Services Agency 
• Office of Representative John Dingell (D-MI) 
• Office of Representative Alcee Hastings (D-FL) 
• Office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) 
• Refugee Specialists, Michigan Department of Human Services 
• State Refugee Coordinator for Arizona 
• State Refugee Coordinator for Colorado 
• State Refugee Coordinator for Michigan 
• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR)  
• U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) 
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) 
 
Foreign Government Agencies and Officials 
• European Commission Humanitarian Aid Organization  
• Office of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) 
• Office of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Development 
(Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations, Inter-Governmental Organizations, and 
Advocacy Groups 
• Amnesty International 
• Human Rights First 
• Human Rights Watch 
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
• International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
• Refugee Council of Australia 
• Refugees International 
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
 
Volags 
• Church World Services 
• Episcopal Migration Ministries 
• Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
• International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
• Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 
• U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
• U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration and Refugee Service 
• World Relief 
 
Local Community Groups and Others 
• American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Dearborn, Michigan Office 
• Chaldean Federation of America 
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• Financial Aid Office, Henry Ford Community College  
• Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University 
• Karbalaa Islamic Education Center 
• Kurdish Human Rights Watch 
• Lamphere School District 
• Office of the Dean, Georgetown University Law Center 
• Holland & Knight LLP 
• Ropes & Gray LLP 
• Student Council on Racial Reconciliation 
 
Service Providers 
• Arab Chaldean Council 
• Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services 
• Archdiocese of Detroit, Office of Refugee Services 
• Catholic Charities, Diocese of San Diego, Refugee Services 
• Center for Victims of Torture 
• International Catholic Migration Commission 
• International Rescue Committee, San Diego, California Office 
• Islamic Relief 
• Lutheran Social Services of Maryland  
• Lutheran Social Services of Michigan Refugee Services, Southfield, Michigan 
Office 
• Save the Children 
• U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Dearborn, Michigan Office  
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 APPENDIX II: MICHIGAN CASE STUDY 
 
Efforts since 2007 to resettle tens of thousands of Iraqis to the United States caused a 
sudden and dramatic increase in refugee arrivals to the state of Michigan, particularly the 
four counties of metropolitan Detroit.  As demonstrated in Table 1, from FY 2006 to FY 
2008, the number of arrivals statewide increased 410%.  Table 3 shows that over the same 
period, the number of arrivals in metropolitan Detroit increased 1,565%. 
 
However, the RSS funding formula allocates federal resources based on the number of 
refugees who arrived to a state in the preceding three years.231  By this metric, RSS funds 
to Michigan actually decreased by four percent from FY 2007 to FY 2008, even though in 
that fiscal year the number of arrivals far eclipsed the three previous years combined. In 
other words, the funding formula set social services capacity in Michigan to assist an 
average of 845 refugees per year. In reality, Michigan received over 3,243 refugees that 
year.  The Detroit area alone received 2,415 refugees, all of whom were Iraqi.  Moreover, 
discretionary grants to supplement the RSS funding were insufficient to compensate for the 
inadequate formula funding. Grants for a combined total of $500,000 were awarded to two 
Detroit-area agencies in 2008.232  
 
In FY 2009 the formula period finally captured the surge in arrivals that began in earnest in 
FY 2008, however RSS funds still only increased by 72.8% from the previous fiscal year.  
Because the arrivals preceding FY 2008 still counted toward allocation entitled to Michigan, 
RSS funds set social services capacity for an average of 1,615 refugees per year.  As of 
August, 3,163 refugees have arrived in Michigan for FY 2009.  
The fiscal years preceding FY 2008 will continue to distort Michigan’s RSS funds until FY 
2011, when the formula period will at last capture three years with increased arrivals.  Until 
that time, social services capacity will be significantly underfunded. 
 
                                                 
231 For FY 2007, FY 2008, and FY 2009, the ORR allocated social services funds according to the following 
formula:  
(1) the total amount of available funds budgeted, divided by;  
(2) the total number of refugees and other eligible populations who arrived in the U.S. in the preceding 
three years, with the resulting per capita multiplied by;  
(3) the number of persons in the state as of September 2007, adjusted for secondary migration. 
 
Office of Refugee Resettlement, Notice of Final Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Formula Allocation for States for Refugee 
Social Services (Aug. 27, 2007), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/HHS-2007-ACF-ORR-RS-
0115_final.html [hereinafter FY 2007 Formula Allocation].  Office of Refugee Resettlement, Notice of Final 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Formula Allocation for States for Refugee Social Services (Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter FY 2008 Formula Allocation].   Office of Refugee Resettlement, Notice of Final Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2009 Formula Allocation for States for Refugee Social Services (July 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/HHS-2009-ACF-ORR-ORRRS-0070.html [hereinafter FY 2009 Formula 
Allocation].  
232 Office of Refugee Resettlement, Unanticipated Arrivals – 2008 Supplemental Services Grantees. available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/unanticipated_arrivals_prg.htm. 
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Table 1.  Total Refugee Arrivals in Michigan, FY 2006-August 2009 
 Iraqi Arrivals233 Total Arrivals234 vs. (FY – 1) vs. (FY – 2) 
FY 2006 153 636 - - 
FY 2007 577 1271 + 99.8% - 
FY 2008 2556 3243 + 155% + 410% 
FY 2009* 2130 3163 - - 
 
Table 2.  Formula Allocations to Michigan for Refugee Social Services 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Refugee Arrivals in Detroit Metro-Area, FY 2006-August 2009 
 Wayne 
Co. 
Oakland 
Co. 
Macomb 
Co. 
Washtenaw 
Co. 
Total vs.  
(FY –1) 
vs.  
(FY – 2) 
FY 2006 42 82 13 8 145 - - 
FY 2007 50 86 383 28 547 + 277% - 
FY 2008 280 943 1138 54 2415 + 341% + 1565% 
FY 2009* 168 720 1081 49 2018 - - 
*Through August 2009 only. 
 
                                                 
233 E-mail from Dawn Arwood, Analyst, Office of Refugee Services, State of Michigan (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:16:46 
EST) (on file with author). Ms. Arwood confirmed that all arrivals for this period were indeed Iraqi. Id. 
234 E-mail from Dawn Arwood, Analyst, Office of Refugee Services, State of Michigan (Sept. 29, 2009, 12:24:27 
EST) (on file with author).  
235 FY 2007 Formula Allocation, supra note 231.  
236 FY 2008 Formula Allocation, supra note 231. 
237 FY 2009 Formula Allocation, supra note 231. 
 Formula 
Period 
Refugees Others Total RSS Funds vs.  
(FY – 1) 
FY 2007235 Oct 03 – Sept 06 2213 769 2982 $1,141,198 - 
FY 2008236 Oct 04 – Sept 07 2535 404 2939 $1,095,849 - 4% 
FY 2009237 Oct 05 – Sept 08 4844 481 5325 $1,894,320 + 72.8% 
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APPENDIX III: IRAQI REFUGEE STORIES 
 
DETROIT 
 
“Hamza” KSLP 1 3/10/2009: Hamza worked as a middle school teacher in Iraq until 
fleeing to Turkey with his wife and daughter in 2008. He was resettled to Detroit, and he 
currently receives financial help from his sons and plans to apply for Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI). His daughter is in school but is too old to qualify as a dependent; therefore, 
the Michigan Department of Human Services is threatening to cut his daughter’s benefits if 
she does not start working.  However, if her benefits are cut, she will either have to give up 
her education to find work.  Alternatively, if Hamza’s SSI application is approved, he will be 
able to support her. 
 
“Qays” GPRW 1 3/10/2009: In Iraq, Qays worked in welding and inventory 
management, having studied for two years at a technical institute. He fled to Lebanon in 
2005, where he also lived through the June 2006 war in that country. He was resettled to 
Columbus, Ohio, with his wife and four children but migrated to Detroit twenty days after 
arrival to connect with a Syrian friend who promised to help him find a job.  After nearly six 
months, he still cannot find work. His family receives $828 per month in cash assistance; 
their monthly rent is $700. 
 
“Wael” KSLP 2 3/10/2009: Before fleeing to Turkey, Wael worked in a liquor store in 
Iraq. Resettled in Detroit, he lives on SSI. Money is tight.  Because there are seven people 
in his family, they need a house, and rent for one is very expensive. 
 
“Waleed” KSLP 5 3/10/2009: Waleed worked as a barber in Iraq before fleeing in 2008 
to Turkey. He was resettled to St. Louis, Missouri, but migrated to Detroit within sixteen 
days to join his second cousin. He planned to join this cousin as soon as he found out he 
was coming to the United States, but they are not sufficiently closely related to qualify for 
sponsorship due to Detroit-specific restrictions imposed in late 2008. Because he was placed 
in St. Louis without a sponsor, his volag used his R&P money for rent and furniture. After 
his family moved to Michigan, his relative supported them until they started receiving their 
benefits. This support, he says, is the most important thing to have as he rebuilds his life. 
 
“Saeed” RWGP 1 3/10/2009: In Iraq, Saeed, who has one year of post-secondary 
technical school education, worked as an oil pipe welder before fleeing in 1998. He lived in 
Jordan for six months, moved to Syria for five years, and then moved to Lebanon until 
2003. He and his wife, mother, and brother were resettled to Chicago, Illinois but migrated 
to Detroit after three weeks because he could not find a job. He now has a two-month-old 
son, and after seven months in Detroit, he still does not have a job. The price of rent 
consumes all his cash assistance.  
 
 “Salah” RWGP 3 3/10/2009: Salah fled Iraq in 1997, living first in Jordan for two years 
and then in Syria for ten years. He was resettled to Columbus, Ohio with his wife and two 
children, but migrated to Detroit ten days later in order to join his religious community and 
reunite with friends. He is a torture survivor, and he has applied for SSI but still has no 
news on his application. In the meantime, he receives nearly $600 per month in cash 
assistance, which is just enough to pay his bills in Detroit. He would move to Dearborn if he 
could afford it.  
 
“Haifa” AWLP 1 3/11/2009: Haifa worked as a social worker at a high school for 15 
years before her children were born. Her family fled to Jordan 2006. Haifa’s 24-year-old son 
and 22-year-old daughter preceded her to Detroit; she and her mother joined them four 
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months later. “We lost everything,” she said. The Mahdi Army accused the family of loyalty 
to Saddam because they are Sunni.  Haifa’s husband and son were kidnapped. One of her 
sons is still in Jordan because security screening delayed his application, even though he is 
young and never served with the Iraqi military.  
 
“Bahja” AWLP 2 3/11/2009: Bahja was a housewife in Iraq before fleeing to Syria in 
2004. Her husband had been a truck driver in Iraq and found work in Syria at a shisha 
factory. Her family was resettled directly to Detroit. Because they arrived on the 28th day of 
the month, their first three days in the United States counted as a full month of their eight-
month total refugee assistance.  Their cash assistance is about to expire, but the family 
qualifies for TANF. Still, they live hand-to-mouth, and the time it will take to reopen their 
case with Michigan Department of Human Services worries Bahja. She insists that her 
husband is capable and can do any work, saying, “Just give him [work].”  
 
“Jameel” KSAW 1 3/11/2009: Jameel worked in tourism and for high-class hotels. After 
the U.S.-led invasion, he worked for four years arranging logistics for a major news outlet. 
In 2007, he fled to Lebanon with his wife and children. They were resettled to Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, as a “free case” because Jameel had no immediate family in the United 
States.  The family migrated to Detroit three months later to join distant relatives. Their 
benefits were reopened quickly after the move to Detroit, and this helped him afford to rent 
his own apartment. Still, they receive only $690 per month in cash assistance, and their 
rent is $750.  
 
“Yusef” KSGP/RW 1 3/11/2009: In Iraq, Yusef owned a used auto parts business before 
fleeing to Syria in 2004, where he lived for four years before being resettled to Detroit. At 
first he, his wife, and their four children lived with relatives on R&P money. Because of 
difficulties finding a suitable home for a family of six, it took two months for them to settle 
in to a home of their own.  During the delay, Yusef and his family did not open their case 
with the Michigan Department of Human Services because their relatives did not want them 
to use their address to apply for benefits. Nine months after their arrival, his oldest son, 
now nineteen, no longer qualifies for assistance. His other three children are 18, 14, and 13 
years old. They receive $680 per month cash assistance; rent alone is $600. He is worried 
because his 18-year-old daughter will soon “age out” of assistance. He cannot work and is 
waiting for an SSI referral from his physician.  
 
“Hakeem” LPAW 1 3/11/2009: Hakeem worked as a driver in Iraq before fleeing to 
Turkey in 2008. He was resettled to Detroit with his wife and four children because his 
wife’s brother was already living there for seven years. Although housing is more expensive 
where they live, they need to be near their brother-in-law because he provides their only 
transportation. They were unable to buy a car because all their R&P money went toward the 
security deposit for the small house they rent. 
 
“Luay” RWGP/KS 1 3/11/2009: Luay has only a sixth-grade education and worked as a 
barber, cleaner, and taxi driver in Iraq before fleeing to Turkey in 2004. He was resettled to 
Detroit with his wife and four children. They live in a two-bedroom apartment for $750 per 
month plus utilities, but receive only $800 monthly in cash assistance. Other landlords 
rejected them because six people living in two bedrooms violates housing codes, even 
though Luay cannot afford a bigger apartment.  After seven months, he still has no job. He 
has been attending ESL classes, but complains that the quality of instruction is poor and all 
the jobs available require English. Once, his caseworker finally found him a job at a hotel; 
he attended three days of unpaid training only to be told that he was no longer needed. As 
the end of his eight months of assistance draws near he says, “I don’t know what to tell 
you. I don’t think about tomorrow. If they stop assistance, God will provide.” 
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“Sinwan” AWKS 1 3/12/2009: In Iraq, the vocation of Sinwan’s husband was to recite 
the Qur’an at religious events. They fled to Syria together in 2002. She registered with the 
UNHCR in Damascus to get assistance and apply for resettlement. Because her husband’s 
friend in Detroit did not qualify as an anchor, they were resettled to Columbus, Ohio, as a 
“free case.” They moved to Detroit seven days later. Sinwan’s husband, a torture survivor, 
suffers from depression and cannot work. Medicaid covers his primary care for now, but 
once it runs out the best they can hope for is Emergency Medicaid, which will not cover 
doctor’s visits. The house they rent has no glass in some of the windows, and she fears the 
cold makes her husband’s depression worse. He has sought mental health services, but has 
yet to receive torture treatment. She wants to work but needs to learn English first. She 
goes to free ESL classes sponsored by a local organization. 
 
“Farrah” AWLP 1 3/12/2009: Farah worked as a physical education teacher in Iraq 
before fleeing to Syria in 2007. She and her mother were resettled to Los Angeles, 
California to join an uncle who lived there but migrated to Detroit after four months. While 
in Los Angeles, she refused to join her uncle’s case because it would reduce his benefits. 
She and her mother waited until their arrival in Michigan to open their cases. Hoping to earn 
a degree or recertify to teach in the United States, she tried to get financial aid to study at 
Henry Ford Community College. Getting financial aid is difficult, she says, because her four-
year degree makes her ineligible for many programs. She resents that she still depends on 
the government and says that she would not have accepted resettlement if she had known 
she would not be able to access the kind of support she needs to get back on her own two 
feet.  
 
“Mariya” AWLP 3 3/12/2009: Mariya was resettled to rural Pennsylvania, after fleeing to 
Jordan with her family in 2007, because she mentioned in her interview with the OPE that 
her brother lives there.  However, after only 19 days in Pennsylvania, she moved to Detroit 
because she wanted to live in an Arab-American community. But now, neither her husband 
nor her son can find work. She complains that the state human service workers make her 
and her family feel like they are begging. 
 
“Nada” AWKS 3 3/13/2009: Before fleeing to Syria in 2007, Nada was a housewife.  In 
Syria, she applied for resettlement immediately because she knew she could never return to 
Iraq. She was resettled to Detroit, joining her brother. Nada now rents an apartment with 
her husband, but without a car, they are isolated.  Although they quickly received food 
stamps, cash assistance took about 40 to 45 days to arrive. Their R&P money was not 
enough in the meantime; it barely paid the first month's bills. Although her husband goes to 
ESL classes, she must stay at home to care for their disabled eight year-old child, as well as 
their four year-old. Despite these difficulties, she does not want to risk moving elsewhere 
because she has family and community in Detroit. 
 
“Seema” AWKS 4 3/13/2009: Seema was a housewife before fleeing to Turkey in 2004. 
She, her husband, and their 17-year-old son were resettled to Detroit.  They lived with her 
brother for a month, and then moved in with her other son and his family. This delayed her 
ability to provide utility bills to the state of Michigan in order to apply for a driver’s license. 
Her 75-year-old husband gets SSI, but she is too young, even though she has a heart 
problem, high cholesterol, and rheumatism. Seema has not heard back yet about her 
Emergency Medicaid application, and she survives on her husband's SSI and her 31-year-
old son's minimum wage income for now. Her  son did not find the job through employment 
services, but by asking around in the Arab community. She loves Michigan and has even 
gotten used to the weather. 
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“Wafa” AWKS 7 3/13/2009: Wafa was a cook and seamstress in Iraq before fleeing to 
Syria in 2006. She was resettled to Chicago, Illinois but migrated to Detroit 55 days later to 
join a relative whom she believed could help her find work. She interviewed for a 
housekeeping position but could not start the next day because she had no transportation. 
Then she was offered a job at a pizza place, but the shift conflicted with her and her 
daughter's ESL class. 
 
“Layla” AWKS 9 3/13/2009: Layla holds a bachelor’s degree in computer science, and in 
2006 she fled to Jordan with her husband. They were resettled to Texas, but did not know 
anyone there.  Nine months later, they joined relatives in Detroit. Layla cannot recertify to 
work in computer science because she is too busy taking care of her three children.   
 
“Sara” AWKS 11 3/13/2009: Sara worked as an accountant in Iraq before fleeing to 
Syria in 2006. She was resettled to South Carolina, where her voluntary agency set her up 
in a one-bathroom house with another Iraqi refugee family and a large Burmese refugee 
family.  After a week of no contact with social workers, Sara decided to join her cousins in 
Michigan after 12 days in South Carolina.  For her, language is a major barrier to 
recertification as an accountant.   
 
“Iman” AWKS 13 3/13/2009: Iman worked as a teacher in Iraq before fleeing to 
Lebanon in 1999. She was resettled to New Mexico but migrated to Detroit thirteen days 
after arrival to reunite with her brother. Although she has been in the United States for six 
months, she still has not received employment authorization. Lacking the English skills and 
documentation of her teaching qualifications, Iman worries that recertifying would take too 
long. She said she would be happy to work as a janitor at a school, just so she can be in an 
educational environment. 
 
“Mr. Aboud” RWLP 3/13/2009: In Iraq, Mr. Aboud worked in the public relations 
department of a pharmaceutical company. He is a veterinarian by training, with a post-
graduate degree in food hygiene. His wife is a physician with a master’s degree in fertility. 
He served the U.S. military as a translator before fleeing with his wife and three children to 
Jordan in 2006. During the two years he lived in Amman, Mr. Aboud worked primarily for 
humanitarian NGOs. He and his family were resettled to Detroit and enrolled in the MG 
program. Mr. Aboud’s volag found his 18-year-old daughter a job at coffee and donut shop, 
but he feels that he received no special attention as a MG client. After confronting his 
caseworker over the results, he was told that his job search was hopeless because he and 
his wife are 50 years old and overqualified. But he claims he did not ask for work that 
matched their qualifications.  He said, “I yelled at this time. I didn’t ask for this. I can work 
as an assistant or a caregiver. I don’t care.” He would like to recertify, but the required 
course costs $9,000, and he and his wife are ineligible for most programs because they 
already have degrees.   
 
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
“Maryam” DHTO 1 3/11/2009: After her husband was killed in 2005, she fled to Jordan 
with her young children.  They registered with the UNHCR immediately and sought 
resettlement. Because no one met her at the airport, she tells us, she had to go to a shelter 
for homeless families. She has been living there with her children ever since. The oldest two 
are enrolled in school, but because it is so far away from the shelter, they have to wake up 
at 5:30 every morning. The transition from a middle-class, married lifestyle in Iraq to 
homelessness and single-parenthood in the United States has been stressful and traumatic. 
She has been taking prescription antidepressants, but now finds that psychiatrists and other 
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doctors will not accept her Medicaid coverage. She says, “I left Iraq to find security, but 
what kind of security is it to live in a homeless shelter?” 
 
“Hamza” IKSF 1 3/13/2009: Hamza worked as a physician in Iraq, including eight 
months under contract in the green zone, before fleeing to Jordan in 2005. During 
resettlement processing in Jordan, he was told that recertification in the United States 
would be easy. After arrival, however, he learned that the process, which must be 
completed in five years, costs nearly $3,000 and includes three exams and a residency 
requirement.  
 
“Mamdouh” TODH 1 3/13/2009: Mamdouh worked as a translator for the U.S. Army in 
eight different units. Later, he worked for a military contractor and then at a foreign 
embassy. After the translating contractor leaked a list of Iraqis who had worked for the 
Multinational Forces, he applied for resettlement. Now that he is in the United States, he 
would like to use his training as an electrical engineer. To be recertified, however, he needs 
a copy of his college diploma, which he was not able to obtain before leaving Iraq.   
 
 
JORDAN 
“Badr” IKJG 2 5/20/2009: Badr has been approved for resettlement but expressed 
concern that it will take a full year before he can adjust his status in the United States. He 
says that getting legal status makes all the difference.  Even though he knows he will 
struggle with financial problems in the United States, he feels will be better off there than in 
Jordan, where he is unable to obtain legal status. 
 
“Adil” IKJG 3 5/20/2009: Adil refused an offer of resettlement to the United States 
because he heard that the assistance is inadequate and too short-lived. He says, “How could 
I buy food for my children? I have medical problems in my back and legs. I wish that the 
United States would look at my health situation.” He works a volunteer with a humanitarian 
assistance NGO and receives a small stipend. 
 
 “Saad” IKJG 5 5/20/2009: Saad was approved for resettlement with his wife and four 
children. He worries that he will arrive and be treated like an immigrant rather than a 
refugee and that he will not get the assistance he needs. He is disappointed that his children 
will miss the end of the school year because of the quick departure, making it necessary to 
repeat a grade.   
 
“Nadir” TODA 1 5/21/2009: Nadir is confined to a wheelchair.  After waiting for news on 
the status of his application for 17 months, he closed his case with IOM because he could 
not bear the process any longer. 
 
“Naima” TODA 2 5/21/2009: Although she is college-educated, Naima is prepared to 
work any job once she, her husband, and their three sons are resettled to Arizona. She is 
well aware that the assistance waiting for them is meager. She looks forward to living in 
safety and stability but expresses her fear of the unknown: “I am happy I will be in America 
because it will be safe and I will feel settled.  But I am scared.  Where will I go if I am 
hungry?  At least I know in Iraq, if I were hungry, I could go knock on my neighbor’s door 
and ask for some food.  But there?  What can I do?” 
 
“Shaimaa” TODA 4 5/21/2009: Before fleeing Iraq, Shaimaa was a student and had 
completed two years of college for graphic design. Without any work in Jordan, she tried 
selling the ceramic art she made to pass time. She sold an expensive piece to man who now 
refuses to pay her. Then she found a job in Amman as a typist in a lawyer’s office; however, 
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when she went to a bank to cash her first check, she was told that the check was deficient 
and she could not cash it.  She was saddened to have encountered such “oppression” while 
waiting for resettlement when, she says, “We have been so patient.” She decries the lack of 
transparency and certainty in the resettlement process saying, “How many years will we be 
waiting here?  Until when?  Until when?  We don’t know our future.  Even those [resettled] 
outside are not secure.  After three months, then what?  What are you going to do?” 
 
“Zainab” TODA 5 5/21/2009: Zainab criticizes the discrimination that Iraqis experience 
in Jordan. Her daughter is paid one-tenth the wages of a Jordanian girl holding the same 
position. Even if an Iraqi is lucky enough to get a job, she says, employers can and do fire 
Iraqis for arbitrary reasons or pretexts. “There is no security here,” she says. 
 
“Amira” TODA 9 5/21/2009: After her infant son was kidnapped and ransomed in Iraq, 
Amira and her family fled to Jordan. The trauma of the experience caused her older son to 
develop a stutter. She believes that if Iraqis had the right to work in Jordan, fewer people 
would seek resettlement. Despite being registered with the UNHCR, she fears that the 
Jordanian government could still mistreat or deport her.  
 
“Subhi” SALP 1 5/22/2009: After fleeing Iraq with his mother, brother, and two married 
sisters in 2005, Subhi did not apply for resettlement for two years because he managed to 
start a hotel business and his father was sick. He has residency in Jordan, but none of his 
other family members do. After approval for resettlement, his family received a travel date 
with only a few weeks notice. Because of his business, he could not just pick up and leave. 
In addition, his sister was pregnant, and her doctor advised her not to fly. He requested a 
delay of departure, but his request was denied, and they both missed their opportunity to 
be resettled. 
 
“Shadi” SALP 2 5/22/2009: Shadi fled Iraq because of threats on his life for working 
with the Multinational Forces.  He registered with the UNHCR immediately to seek 
resettlement.  
When his case reached the OPE, it needed verification from the commanding officer of the 
battalion with which he worked. However, the OPE was unable to contact the commanding 
officer, who had since been transferred to another unit. Without this verification, his 
application cannot move forward. Still, he is hopeful that he will reach California, where he 
has a relative. He knows resettlement will be very difficult and that he will have to work 
right away, but he is ready and willing. He had to work every single day in Iraq, he says, so 
that proves he is a hard worker. “No place on earth is easy. But if you work, you will play.” 
 
“Zaki” DATO 2 5/22/2009: As a young student studying Farsi, Zaki fled Iraq in 2004 
because his service in the Iraqi military subjected him to threats from both militias and 
members of the insurgency after he refused to fight against American forces. He believes 
his application with the UNHCR is moving slowly because of his military service. He did not 
understand why there was no explicit support from the U.S. government for people, like 
him, who are refugees because they refused to take up arms against Americans. Although 
deportation from Jordan is not as bad as it once was, the insecurity that comes from lacking 
legal status still makes the situation for Iraqis in Jordan very difficult. Aware of the 
differences in assistance between American states, he told us, "The situation in the [United 
States] depends on the state. But really, whatever it can be, you are better there than in 
Amman because at least you have legal status.”  
 
“Riaz” DATO 4 5/23/2009: Riaz fled Iraq in 2006 and now studies Management 
Information Systems at a private Jordanian university.  He applied for resettlement.  His 
case moved very quickly, but he let his application falter because of his misgivings about 
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resettlement in the United States. First, he is concerned that he will not be able to access 
health care for a chronic condition that has already resulted in three surgeries.  Second, he 
feared that he would not be able to find work that does not require labor that exceeds his 
physical limitations.  He says, “If I can work, it would have to be behind a desk. And I don’t 
know what options are available.” Third, he fears that resettlement will result in the 
suspension of his studies indefinitely, and he knows that it would be difficult to receive 
financial support to finish his degree at an expensive U.S. university.  He does not 
understand why the government would not help refugees get an education.  
 
“Zayd” IKSA 1 5/23/2009: After fleeing to Jordan in 2004, Zayd registered with the 
UNHCR for assistance. Despite the fact that most of his family is in Sweden, he was told 
that his case would be suspended unless he accepted an offer to resettle in the United 
States.   For him, the difference in benefits between the United States and Sweden is not 
important; he just wants to be with his family so that he can help his siblings care for their 
mother.  
 
“Bakr” JGLP 1 5/23/2009: Bakr applied for an Special Immigrant Visa while still in Iraq, 
but the application moved slowly.  After he was shot in the leg, he fled to Jordan.  He sleeps 
with a pistol under his pillow  “I still have nightmares now. I am just starting to heal,” he 
says. It took three months to transfer his visa application when he left Iraq. While waiting in 
Jordan, he tried to move the process along by sending the OPE a picture of his wounds. He 
received notice of approval just six days before his departure.  The three-month wait in 
Jordan depleted most of his savings, so he only had about $100 left to take with him to the 
United States. 
 
“Gabr” JGLP 2 5/23/2009: Gabr fled Iraq in 2006 and registered with the UNHCR for 
protection and assistance upon arrival in Jordan. He did not apply for resettlement until a 
year later.  His application was denied after one seven-minute interview, and  he has tried 
multiple times to reapply and ask about resettlement. “No one is giving me a chance,” he 
says.  He wants resettlement because he feels very insecure in Jordan and knows that he 
could be deported at any time. If that happens, he says, “I will be killed.” “If I lose my 
family, my home, respect, I mean nothing. I am here illegally . . . . I want to begin again. I 
only want to live in peace, to live in respect.” He told us that the uncertainty of his situation 
makes him feel as threatened as he did when he was in Iraq.  
 
 
